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Informality and Inclusive Growth in Latin America: The Case of Colombia 
 
Cristina Fernandez and Leonardo Villar 
 
 
Summary 
The purpose of this research is to understand the impact of informality on inclusive growth in 
Latin America, and particularly in Colombia. The relationship between informality and 
inclusive growth is represented by two different hypotheses. According to the traditional 
perspective, informality constrains inclusive growth by restricting growth of the formal sector, 
draining resources from the public treasury and supplying low quality jobs that are unable to 
provide adequate conditions for a better standard of living. However, from another point of 
view, informality provides a default alternative to unemployment, particularly amongst poorly 
educated individuals; a perspective that is rarely taken into account in Latin America. 
Drawing on the case study of Colombia as well as a review of literature on Latin America, 
one of the main conclusions of this paper is that both hypotheses hold, yet their relevance 
depends on labour market restrictions and the socio-economic characteristics of informal 
workers since the informal sector in Latin America demonstrates considerable heterogeneity. 
 
Keywords: informality; inclusive growth; labour markers; payroll taxes; wedge tax; labour 
tax; Latin America; Colombia.  
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Executive summary 
 
The purpose of this research is to understand the impact of informality on inclusive growth in 
Latin America, and particularly in Colombia. The relationship between informality and 
inclusive growth is represented by two different hypotheses. According to the traditional view, 
informality constrains inclusive growth by restricting growth of the formal sector, draining 
resources from the public treasury and supplying low quality jobs that are unable to provide 
adequate conditions for a better standard of living. However, from another point of view, 
informality is a default alternative to unemployment, particularly among poorly educated 
individuals; a perspective that is rarely taken into account in Latin America.  
 
The case study of Colombia is relevant to the region, not only because Colombia 
demonstrates regional averages in terms of informality and inclusive growth, but also 
because the informal sector is highly heterogeneous and this allows for simultaneous testing 
of both hypotheses. Another interesting feature of Colombia is that it is one of the few 
countries that have implemented an active policy to reduce informality in recent years. As 
such, it is expected that the experience of Colombia will provide useful insight for countries 
facing formal labour market restrictions such as Argentina, Brazil and Costa Rica. 
Notwithstanding, the impact of any policy will vary depending on the specific characteristics 
of informality in each country.  
 
The analysis of the relationship between informality and inclusive growth has been 
understudied in general, perhaps because of the multiple channels that intervene in this 
relationship, as well as the lack of a consensus around the definition of both variables. For 
the purpose of this paper, we understand informality as those jobs or firms that are not 
regulated and/or do not contribute to public funds; and inclusive growth as growth 
accompanied by poverty reductions and equal opportunities for all segments of the 
population. Given this concept is rather broad, we have defined a set of inclusive growth 
indicators relating to the labour market as: employment, labour earnings, income distribution 
across different population groups, labour satisfaction, job stability and productivity. Exploring 
the way these variables impact inclusive growth is beyond the scope of this project. 
However, we have included in the literature review an assessment of evidence concerning 
the macroeconomic impact of informality, given the amount of externalities that tend to arise 
from individual labour decisions.    
 
One of the main conclusions of this paper is that an analysis of informality cannot be 
performed assuming that informal workers are a mass of individuals with similar 
characteristics. In fact, in Latin America informal workers range from poorly educated 
individuals including women heads of household and the older population, to highly educated 
young adults living in productive cities. This finding corroborates new literature which points 
to heterogeneity in labour markets in terms of the coexistence of three types of informal 
workers: the ‘structural’ informal worker, for whom informality represents a default option to 
unemployment due to poor education, skills or experience; the ‘induced’ informal worker who 
is segmented from the formal labour market due to high entry restrictions or to less obvious 
restrictions, such as segregation; and, finally, the ‘voluntary’ informal worker who chooses to 
be informal. 
 
The relationship between informality and inclusive growth is very different between these 
three groups. In terms of ‘structural informality’, informality represents a default option to 
unemployment and, as such, it is difficult to argue against the idea that among this group 
informality promotes inclusive growth. In contrast, ‘induced informality’ may constrain 
inclusive growth because labour market barriers prevent a population group from obtaining 
higher benefits and work stability available in the formal market. And, finally, ‘voluntary 
informality’, might be viewed as beneficial at an individual level, but not at an aggregate level 
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because individuals and/or firms restrict themselves to operating in a less productive 
environment in order to obtain certain ‘free-rider’ benefits. In any case, it cannot be ignored 
that informality negatively impacts inclusive growth at a macroeconomic level. Existing 
literature supports the view that informality lowers productivity, erodes the tax base, reduces 
productivity, produces unfair competition with the formal sector and increases corruption in 
Latin America. 
 
The present analysis leads to important policy recommendations that are relevant not only in 
Colombia but in most developing countries. Although this research does not analyse policies 
implemented to address informality in detail, some lessons can be drawn from the literature 
review relating to the appropriateness of different approaches for targeting different groups of 
informal workers. While some informal workers might benefit from the removal of barriers to 
formal employment or affirmative action, structural informality must be tackled with different 
kinds of policy, such as improving access to education and flexible pension systems. 
Similarly, in the case of voluntary informality, monitoring and controlling informal 
professionals might be effective, whereas the same approach applied to structural informality 
might produce a negative impact on inclusive growth.  
 
In December 2012, the Colombian government reformed the tax law by reducing payroll 
taxes from 29.5 per cent to 16 per cent. Our estimations show that this reform led to a one-
off significant but moderate reduction in informality among the target population of about  
7 percentage points, after controlling for some observable and unobservable variables. 
However, some of this reduction was the result of formal workers with flexible work becoming 
fully formal workers earning a minimum wage. We also found that the reform was even more 
effective among those workers with secondary education or less, showing that the impact of 
policies oriented towards reducing barriers to informality is not restricted to the higher tier of 
informal workers. This experience is of value for countries with high payroll taxes as well as 
high and enforced minimum wages.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Informality is usually considered as a constraint to inclusive growth because, independently 
of our preferences for big or small governments, there is always the need for a pool of 
resources to meet communal expenses. When half of the working population or firms do not 
contribute to these expenses, as is the case in some Latin American countries, major 
problems can arise. A large informal economy also implies lower productivity, more 
corruption and represents a source of low quality jobs that are unable to provide adequate 
conditions for a better standard of living. However, informal employment also plays a key role 
in absorbing the unemployed and as such it might increase inclusive growth. This is 
particularly true for those groups considered vulnerable in terms of gender, race, age and 
education. 
 
The purpose of this research is to understand the impact of informality on inclusive growth in 
Latin America and particularly in Colombia. To date, this relationship has been understudied, 
perhaps because of the multiple factors that interact in this relationship, as well as the lack of 
consensus around the definition of both variables. For the purposes of this paper, we 
understand informality as those jobs or firms that are not regulated and/or do not contribute 
to the public funds; and inclusive growth as economic growth accompanied by poverty 
reductions and equal opportunities for all segments of the population. Since this concept of 
inclusive growth is rather broad, we have restricted our set of indicators to: employment, 
labour income, distribution of earnings across different groups of the population, labour 
satisfaction and stability, and labour productivity. Examining the way these variables impact 
inclusive growth is beyond the scope of this research. However, we have included in the 
literature review evidence concerning the macroeconomic impact of informality, given the 
amount of externalities that tend to arise from individual labour decisions.    
 
In order to explore our central research question, we investigate three specific hypotheses. 
First, informality may promote inclusive growth by acting as a buffer to unemployment and 
creating opportunities for vulnerable populations. By providing incomes to those who might 
otherwise be unemployed, informality allows individuals to engage in the economy and 
potentially benefit from economic growth. This is relevant for the structurally unemployed - 
those who have little hope of accessing the formal labour market - and for the cyclically 
unemployed, who may enter the informal sector during economic downturns, particularly if 
unemployment benefits, or any other type of transfers that favour unemployment over 
informality, are low or non-existent.  
 
Second, informality may constrain inclusive growth both at an individual and at a society level 
through lower quality employment and lower productivity, and also by impacting growth and 
jobs in the formal sector. By preventing an important group of the population from obtaining 
higher wages, benefits and work stability, informality constrains inclusive growth, provided 
that these factors are present in the formal sector. In addition, informality generates lower 
productivity, erodes the tax system, increases the incidence of corruption and operates as a 
source of unfair competition to formal firms. Similarly, informal workers act as ‘free riders’ by 
congesting and not paying for public services. 
 
Third, facilitating transitions from unemployment to informal employment and from informality 
to formality promotes inclusive growth. Smoother transitions may help ensure a more 
efficient allocation of resources and greater benefits for workers, firms and society as a 
whole. In the case of Colombia, we will focus on estimating the impact of reducing payroll 
taxes on informality. This issue is highly relevant, not only for Colombian authorities, but also 
for other governments in Latin America and Africa that might consider following this road in 
order to reduce informality. 
 
 10 
The two general perspectives about the relationship between informality and inclusive growth 
described at the outset closely relate to older discussions around integrated, segmented and 
induced informal markets. First, the general idea of segmented markets (Lewis 1954; Harris 
& Todaro 1970) relates to ‘structural informality’ wherein for a particular portion of the 
population, informality represents the only available alternative to unemployment. Second, 
the notion of integrated markets (Maloney 2004), relates to those individuals/firms that 
voluntarily decide to take a job/operate in the informal rather than formal market. Under this 
scenario individual/firms may benefit from informality at an individual, but not at an aggregate 
level because individuals/firms are restricting themselves to operating in a less productive 
environment. Finally, the concept of ‘induced informality’ (De Soto 2000) relates to 
individuals prepared to operate in the formal sector but segregated from this market by high 
entry barriers that are either explicit in legislation or implicit as in the case of segregation. 
These barriers constrain inclusive growth by preventing workers from obtaining higher 
wages, benefits and work stability (Loayza 1997). There is also a macroeconomic cost to 
informality that applies to all types described above (Levy 2008; Perry 2008). 
 
The type of informality that prevails in each country will vary and has important implications 
for policy making. For example, while ‘induced informality’ might be tackled by removing 
formal employment barriers or by implementing affirmative action policies and childcare 
programmes, ‘structural informality’ requires a different policy approach, such as improved 
education and flexible pension systems, among others. Similarly, in the case of ‘voluntary 
informality’, providing economic incentives to formalise and enforce formality might be 
effective, whereas the same policy applied to structural informality could have a negative 
impact on inclusive growth. In terms of our three specific hypotheses, removing entry barriers 
to the informal labour market could facilitate transition from unemployment to informality, 
and, likewise, removing entry barriers to the formal labour market could improve the 
transition from informality to formality, depending on context-specific constraints to inclusive 
growth. 
 
We started our analysis expecting to be able to locate countries according to either of the two 
general hypotheses and to formulate policy recommendations accordingly. However, one of 
the main conclusions of this paper is that informality cannot be analysed based on the 
assumption that informal workers are a bulk mass of individuals with similar characteristics. 
Instead, the informal sector should be understood as involving a mixture of individuals with 
different characteristics who operate in diverse environments. This finding corroborates new 
studies that have also identified heterogeneity in informality labour markets (Perry 2008; 
Garcia 2014; Ulyssea 2013; Alcaraz et al. 2012). 
 
The case of Colombia is relevant for identifying lessons for the Latin American region not 
only because Colombia demonstrates regional averages in terms of informality and inclusive 
growth, but also because the country is home to a highly heterogeneous informal sector and 
this allows for simultaneous testing of both hypotheses. Another interesting feature of 
Colombia is that it is one of the few countries that have implemented policies aimed at 
reducing informality in recent years. Thus it is expected that lessons drawn from Colombia 
will be useful to other countries facing high formal labour costs, such as Argentina, Brazil and 
Costa Rica. Notwithstanding, the impact of any policy addressing informality will vary 
depending on the particular characteristics found in each country.  
 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the research and design methods; 
section 3 presents evidence from the Latin America regional literature review; section 4 
provides an analysis of the case of Colombia; section 5 summarises the main lessons, and 
section 6 provides conclusions and policy recommendations. 
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2. Research design and methods 
 
The complexity of analysing the relationship between informality and inclusive growth is due 
in part to the lack of a common or standard definition for either of these concepts, the variety 
of channels that explain the impact of informality over inclusive growth and the number of 
variables that affect inclusive growth outside the labour market. We address these issues as 
follows. 
 
Definition and measurement of informality 
The definition of informality varies, however for the purpose of this paper we understand it as 
jobs or firms that are not regulated and/or do not contribute to public funds, as this covers the 
majority of definitions provided in the literature. Both firms and individuals are included in the 
definition, which means that informal workers can work either in the formal or the informal 
sector.  
 
There are also several ways to measure informality. The two most commonly used are:  
(i) the firm definition, which is closely related to the type and size of the firm and therefore 
with the quality of the job,1 and; (ii) the legal definition, which relates to compliance with legal 
requirements and the kind of social protection provided to the worker. The correlation 
coefficient for both measures in Latin America is 0.85 (Tornarolli et al. 2012). In the case of 
Colombia, we mostly use the firm measure because it is most frequently used by Colombian 
authorities and the most suitable for making international comparisons since it does not vary 
according to local enforcement and regulation policies (as the legal definition may).The firm 
definition also enables us to maintain greater consistency across the research since we have 
chosen to explore the impact of lowering payroll tax, and the legal definition is not amenable 
to the method that we selected. We occasionally do use the legal definition, however, to 
provide robustness to our findings or where necessary due to data availability.  
 
Definition and measurement of inclusive growth and its relationship with 
informality 
As with informality, there is no standard definition of inclusive growth. However, the literature 
broadly understands it as growth accompanied by poverty reductions and equal opportunities 
for all segments of the population. Attempts to measure inclusive growth include McKinley 
(2010), Ali and Son (2007), Almeida-Ramos, Ranieri and Lammes (2013) and Anand, Mishra 
and Peiris (2013).  
 
Using these inclusive growth indexes, or any other welfare analysis methodology, to analyse 
informality and inclusive growth would necessarily imply an oversimplification of our findings 
and may compromise their applicability across different contexts. Instead, we use data-based 
evidence methodologies to review each of the channels through which informality may affect 
inclusive growth. By using this approach, rather than generating a 'one-size-fits-all' 
recommendation, we recognise the diversity in country contexts. In addition, we limit the set 
of variables for analysing inclusive growth to those related to the labour market, namely: 
employment, labour income, distribution of earnings across groups of the population, labour 
satisfaction and stability, and labour productivity. Exploring the way these variables impact 
inclusive growth is beyond the scope of this research. However, we do include a literature 
review of the macroeconomic impact of informality, given the amount of externalities that 
tend to arise from individual labour decisions.    
                                               
1   This category includes workers employed in firms with no more than five employees; unpaid family helpers or 
housekeepers; self-employed with the exception of independent professionals and technicians; and business owners or 
firms with no more than five workers. This criterion changed from 10 workers or less (ILO10) to 5 workers or less (ILO5) 
showing a higher correlation with other measures of informality (Bernal 2009).Since 1999 the Delhi Group established 
the ILO5 as the standard measurement of informality (Central Statistical Organisation 1999). 
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Channels through which informality impacts inclusive growth 
As explained previously, our analysis is focused on some relevant channels that occur inside 
the labour markets. Channels selected for each hypothesis and the methods used to 
approach each of them are explained below. 
 
Channels through which the transition from unemployment to informality can improve 
inclusive growth are: (i) informal employment reduces unemployment, particularly among 
some vulnerable groups; (ii) informal employment is associated with a higher income than 
unemployment, even in the presence of unemployment benefits; and (iii) informal 
employment can prove to be useful in economic downturns to prevent serious falls in living 
standards, however this depends on the informal sector constituting a counter-cyclical 
variable. The methods used to analyse these channels are: (i) review of surveys identifying 
informality as a default alternative to unemployment; (ii) characterisation of informal workers, 
and particularly the most vulnerable, to identify the incidence of informality among this 
segment; (iii) transition matrices to analyse the frequency of transitions between groups and 
whether these transitions are increasing inclusive growth by facilitating the functioning of the 
labour markets, and; (iv) pro-cyclical analysis of informality to confirm whether informality 
acts as a buffer to unemployment during hard times2. 
 
Channels through which informality constrains inclusive growth are: (i) informal employment 
generates less income, benefits and stability than formal employment; (ii) informal sector 
productivity is lower than formal sector productivity, controlling for observable variables such 
as size, and; (iii) informality erodes the tax base and/or the quantity and/or quality of public 
services. The methods used to analyse these channels are the following: (i) analysis of 
income, work satisfaction and stability of informal versus formal workers controlling for 
observable characteristics and using Matching methods; (ii) analysis of differences in 
productivity between formal and informal workers controlling for size and using Matching 
methods and (iii) analysis of the fiscal impact of informality based on a review of relevant 
literature.  
 
Concerning policies oriented at facilitating labour market transitions, we concentrate our 
efforts on measuring the impact of lowering the payroll tax through a methodology that mixes 
Matching and Differences in Differences techniques. The reasons for applying this 
methodology instead of other techniques are explained in section 4. We also analysed the 
distributional impact of this particular reform by measuring its impact on specific segments of 
the population as well as Lorenz curves. 
  
                                               
2  The pro-cyclical analysis of informality also helps to identify whether informality is the result of an individual choice, 
which is explained later. 
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3. Informality and inclusive growth in Latin 
America 
 
With the exception of Heintz (2012), who presents a general approach and formulates an 
agenda to analyse the relationship between informality and inclusive growth, this topic has 
not been explicitly researched at a global level or in the Latin American region. However, 
some literature does analyse the channels through which informality impacts inclusive 
growth. This evidence, organised according to our three hypotheses, allows us to get a good 
grasp of the mechanisms through which informality impacts inclusive growth in the region. In 
this section, we begin by presenting an overview of informality and inclusive growth in Latin 
America as well as the main attempts to measure this relationship. Second, we summarise 
the literature that explores the channels through which informality promotes and constrains 
inclusive growth. Third, we review policies aimed at increasing inclusive growth by tackling 
informality and, finally, we provide conclusions and identify the knowledge gaps that we 
intend to fill in the subsequent section. 
 
Informality in Latin America and Colombia 
Informality is a challenge of great dimensions in Latin America. The average informality rate 
among the largest 14 economies is 46 per cent, representing nearly 130 million informal 
workers in the region (ECLAC/ILO 2015). In countries like Bolivia, Honduras and Paraguay, 
up to 70 per cent of workers are informally employed (OECD 2015). Furthermore, informality 
rates are particularly high among vulnerable groups in the region: 75 per cent of all workers 
with low levels of education, 50 per cent of working women (FORLAC 2014) and 55 per cent 
of young workers are informal workers (FORLAC 2015).  
 
Graph 3.1 
Informality in Latin America based on the firm definition 
Panel A: 8 Countries- simple average Panel B: 13 Countries- weighted average 
 
Source: Panel A: Tornarolli (2014) based on household surveys of the countries  
Panel B: (ILO 2013b), based on official information of the household surveys of the countries. 
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Despite these figures, Latin America does not show particularly high informality rates among 
developing countries. According to WIEGO (2014), sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and East 
Asia have even higher average informality rates as a percentage of non-agricultural 
employment. Nevertheless, as shown in Table 3.1, given the higher proportion of 
economically active population and urbanisation rates in Latin America, urban informality is 
higher relative to the size of the total population than it is in African countries, for example. 
Notwithstanding, informality rates have declined in Latin America over the last ten years. 
From the early nineties to the early 2000’s, the informality rate remained constant at around 
53 per cent and then lowered to 46.8 per cent in 2013, as shown in Graph 3.1. This period of 
improvements in the labour market coincided with high growth rates, and it is therefore 
difficult to establish the drivers behind this reduction. As such, the question arises whether or 
not informality may go back to its previous level as a result of the recent downturn in the 
region’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 
 
In Colombia, almost half of the working population is engaged in the informal sector, despite 
the fact that informality shows a declining trend. As of June 2015, 48 per cent of the working 
population in the 13 main metropolitan areas was informal, compared with 54.7 per cent back 
in 2002 (GEIH 2007-2015; ECH 2002-2006).3 In Graph 3.2 we compare this measurement 
with other measurements for labour informality, such as workers who do not make 
contributions to state health and pension schemes or do not contribute to either. As Graph 
3.2 shows, although there are some differences in level of informality, which ranged between 
44 per cent and 51 per cent in 2014 depending on the definition adopted, all the measures 
demonstrate similar behaviour across time, including a negative trend since the year 2000. 
Thus, the number of workers in the formal sector and people contributing to non-wage 
benefits has increased in the country.  
 
Table 3.1 
Regional informality rates (2004 to 2010) 
  
Informality/non 
agricultural 
employment 
Non agricultural 
employment/population 
Latin America and the Caribbean  51 50 
Sub-Saharan Africa  66 28 
Middle East and North Africa  45 33 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia  10 46 
South Asia  82 26 
East and Southeast Asia (excluding China)  65 38 
China *  33  N/A 
 
 
 
Source: Wiego (2014) and own calculations 
* Estimates for urban China based on six cities: Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Shanghai, Shenyang, Wuhan and Xi-an  
 
 
 
Inclusive growth and informality in Latin America and Colombia 
According to the inclusive growth index produced by Almeida-Ramos et al. (2013), which 
takes into account per capita income growth, income distribution, poverty reduction and 
employment generation in 2006, most Latin American countries are ranked between the 
high-medium range, such as Mexico and Uruguay; the medium range, including Brazil, Chile, 
                                               
3  Based on ILO5. 
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Ecuador, El Salvador, Paraguay and Peru; and the medium-low range, such as Bolivia, 
Colombia, the Dominican Republic and Panama. Similarly, the index produced by Anand et 
al. (2013), which takes into account per capita income growth and income distribution 
variables from 1990 to the latest available data in 2013, classifies Venezuela, Bolivia and 
Colombia as countries with low levels of inclusive growth and Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador and 
Mexico as Latin American countries with medium levels of inclusive growth.  
 
Graph 3.2 
Informality.  Rates based on different measures 
 
Source: Own calculations based on GEIH 2007-2014 
 
 
Adopting a less systematic approach, Cord (2015) claims that after the eighties and nineties 
when Latin America was last or second to last in terms of regional growth and income 
distribution, the region emerged with one of the best performances in terms of inclusive 
growth during the 2000’s, registering a growth rate higher than the world average, reducing 
extreme poverty by half and achieving considerable reductions in income gaps. Similarly, 
Colombia, a country with low to medium-low inclusive growth levels, has recently achieved 
remarkable results reducing poverty from 50 per cent in 2002 to 28.5 per cent in 2014. 
Regarding income distribution, however, the results were less impressive. Although the Gini 
coefficient that measures income inequality reduced from 0.57 in 2002 to 0.53 in 2014, it 
continues to be one of the highest in the world. Neither of these indexes and analyses takes 
into account the most recent period, 2015 in particular, during which time growth has 
seriously slowed in most countries of the region, probably affecting these achievements.  
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Graph 3 plots the two reviewed indexes of inclusive growth against informality for the set of 
countries for which data is available4. It is possible to observe a slightly negative but low 
correlation between the two variables. The correlation coefficient between the level of self 
employment and the level of inclusiveness, according to the 2006 Almeida-Ramos et al. 
(2013) index5, is -0.02. The correlation coefficient in terms of changes, using the Anand et al. 
(2013) index and self-employment6, is -0.3. Both relationships are significant to 95 per cent. 
As can be observed in Graph 3.3, South Africa is an outlier in this matter, whereas Colombia, 
showing more standard results, is one of the countries with the most negative correlation 
between informality and inclusive growth.  
 
Graph 3.3 
Informality and inclusive growth 
Informality (ILO) and inclusiveness, 2006 
(inverse A. Ramos et al., 2010) 
Change in self-employment and inclusive 
growth index (2010/1990) 
(Anand et al., 2013) 
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on ILO (2014), World Bank 2015 World Development Indicators, Almeida-Ramos et al (2010) 
and Anand et. al. (2013). 
Note: In the case of South Africa, change in self-employment is calculated with respect to the 2000’s due to data availability.  
 
Results in Graph 3.3 also suggest that the relationship between inclusive growth and 
informality is either negative or non-existent. A negative correlation is consistent with the 
literature that relates informality to some of the components commonly used to measure 
inclusive growth. Loayza and Rigolini (2006), for example, found that countries with low GDP 
per capita tend to have higher self-employment rates, used as a proxy for informality. They 
also found that an increase in one standard deviation in informality leads to a decline of  
                                               
4  These countries are Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Chile, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Jamaica, Madagascar, Mexico, Namibia, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Panama, Peru, South Africa, 
Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela and Zambia.  
5  Or the inverse index, since for Ramos et al. (2013) a higher index means less inclusiveness whereas for Anand et al. 
(2013) a higher index means greater inclusiveness. 
6  We used self-employment as a proxy, since the ILO does not provide informality series. 
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0.7 to 1 percentage points in the rate of per capita growth and an increase of 0.12 to 0.24 
percentage points in poverty rates7. Perry et al (2007) found a strong correlation between 
informality and inequality at a global level, while Maurizio (2013) and the Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC 2014) found that formalisation 
had a positive effect on labour income distribution in Latin America. Nevertheless, since it is 
small, the correlation coefficient between informality and inclusive growth indexes might also 
suggest the existence of conflicting forces that underlie informality, and which may promote 
or restrict inclusive growth, as we have suggested in our two hypotheses. 
 
3.1. Informality may promote inclusive growth by acting as a buffer to 
unemployment and creating opportunities for vulnerable populations: a 
literature review 
 
This section provides a review of literature relating to our first hypothesis by examining 
surveys reports, transitions, counter-cyclicality movements of informal employment and 
incidence of informality among vulnerable groups. 
 
In the previous sections, we hypothesised that informality might be positive for inclusive 
growth by offering a substitute to unemployment, provided that informal earnings are higher 
than unemployment benefits, which is not an issue in Latin America given the lack of these 
benefits. It should also be noted that in the case of ‘induced informality’, providing an 
alternative to unemployment can only result in more inclusive growth if reducing explicit or 
implicit barriers to the formal labour market is not an option.  
 
Drivers of informality 
From the point of view of preferences, Arias and Bustelo (2007) and Arias, Landa and Yañez 
(2007) use household surveys to determine that 59 per cent of the self-employed in 
Colombia would prefer to have a job in the formal market. This figure amounts to 40 per cent 
in Argentina, 26 per cent in Bolivia and 25 per cent in the Dominican Republic. Among 
informal salaried workers, preferences for a formal job are 60 per cent in Colombia, 57 per 
cent in Argentina, 48 per cent in Bolivia and 43 per cent in the Dominican Republic.  
 
Although not strictly comparable with one another, the surveys also reported that a common 
reason for self-employment is the impossibility of finding a salaried job. This was cited as the 
main reason by 25 per cent of interviewees in Bolivia; the first or second most important 
reason by 55 per cent and 52 per cent of interviewees in Colombia and the Dominican 
Republic respectively, and as a relevant reason amongst 58.8 per cent of Argentineans8. 
According to Perry et al. (2008)9, in Mexico, 44 per cent of the male population chose self-
employment because of higher earnings and only 12.4 per cent because they could not find 
a job in the formal market. Among women, only 6 per cent reported that they could not find a 
job in the formal market. In Brazil, 33 per cent of people in informal self-employment said 
they would leave their current job for a salaried contract. The surveys in Mexico and Brazil 
also show a higher preference for independent work among women and older populations. 
While these results demonstrate that an important portion of the population works informally 
because they can’t find a job in the formal market, there is also clear and significant 
heterogeneity between and within countries, with Colombia showing the highest preference 
for formal employment and Mexico the lowest.   
 
                                               
7  All the results were significant and controlled for enforcement and partially controlled for endogeneity through 
instrumental variables. 
8  The survey asked for the main reason in Bolivia, up to two reasons in Colombia, and the two most important reasons in 
the Dominican Republic, whereas in Argentina the question permitted multiple responses. 
9  Based on local surveys. In the case of Mexico, the survey asked respondents to identify the main motivation. 
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Counter-cyclicality 
Another popular indicator used to measure whether informal employment is a substitute to 
unemployment is counter-cyclicality. According to Tornarolli et al. (2014), in the presence of 
labour market rigidities and involuntary informal sector employment, when the economy 
enters into recession and a minimum wage exists, some of the formal firms fire workers who 
subsequently find refuge in the informal sector. Therefore, the ratio of informal to formal 
workers tends to increase during downturns. Similarly, when the economy grows the cost of 
hiring becomes relatively lower and the ratio of informal to formal employment decreases 
(Loayza and Rigolini 2006). However, in the presence of voluntary informal workers, during 
upturns, an increase in the informal wage should attract informal workers and increase the 
size of the sector, parallel or even pro-cyclically to the increase in formal employment10.  
 
Some of the most important findings in this respect can be summarised as follows. Bosch 
and Maloney (2008), in the case of Mexico and to a lesser extend in Brazil, found that 
transitions between formality and informality operate as though the two markets were well 
integrated, whereby informal employment does not behave as a substitute to unemployment 
in Mexico. Using information from household surveys, Tornarolli et al. (2014) found the 
informality rate to be counter-cyclical in Brazil, Colombia and Chile, mostly among salaried 
informal workers and in Uruguay and Venezuela, mostly among the self-employed, and did 
not find any clear relationship in other countries such as Costa Rica and Peru. Loayza et al. 
(2006) also found good evidence confirming the prevalence of counter-cyclicality of 
informality in the region. Finally, Fiess et al. (2008) found that whereas informal employment 
in Mexico and Brazil tends to be pro-cyclical, in Argentina and Colombia this relationship is 
counter-cyclical. Their main finding, however, is that the issue of counter/pro-cyclicality is 
very much associated with the shocks faced by the countries and therefore it is dependent 
on the period of analysis. In sum, most studies signal that informal markets tend to be pro-
cyclical in Mexico and counter-cyclical in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Uruguay and 
Venezuela. Evidence for Brazil suggests pro-cyclicality, however results are less conclusive 
in this case.   
 
Incidence of informality among workers with low education, skills and experience 
In general, there is a higher incidence of informality among certain vulnerable groups in Latin 
America, namely: women heads of household, the old and the very young and very low-
educated workers. This would not be a problem if labour decisions were voluntary, in fact in 
this case informality might increase inclusive growth at an individual level. This is less clear 
in the case of workers that would prefer to have a job in the formal market but are unable to 
find it, either because they have low levels of education and experience or because they face 
high entry barriers to the formal market. Drawing on this approach, we first review literature 
that analyses the incidence of informality among the poorly educated population and the very 
young population. We then analyse the incidence of informality and signs of segmentation 
among the women and ethnic minorities. 
 
According to ILO (2013a), the incidence of informality among the low educated population in 
Latin America is high, averaging 63 per cent among workers with primary education and 75 
per cent among workers with less than primary education; compared with a rate of 47 per 
cent for those with secondary education. Similarly, Gong, Van Soest and Villagomez (2004) 
showed that in Mexico education is negatively correlated with informal work. Haanwinckel 
and Soares (2014) found in Brazilthat an increase in the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers 
between 2003 and 2012 was partly related to a decline in informalityand that without this 
increment informality would have increased by 4.8 percentage points, instead of declining by 
                                               
10  According to Fiess, Fugazza and Maloney (2008), during booms generated by commodity exports, which promote the 
informal-intensive service sector, one might expect informal employment to be even more pro-cyclical than formal 
employment.  
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6.4. Finally, Herrera, Lopez and Montellon (2013) found that differences in income between 
formal and informal workers in Colombia are much higher for the low educated population 
because iinformal workers face not only lower returns on their education, but also suffer a 
second penalty associated with educational mismatches. However, as El Badaoui and 
Rebiére (2012) point out, even if higher education means a better chance of engaging in the 
formal sector, it does not mean that educated workers cannot search for an informal job. 
 
Concerning age, the young population in Latin America demonstrates an average informality 
rate of 56 per cent compared with 46 per cent among the adult population. This segment also 
shows an unemployment rate two to four times higher than that of adults in the region (ILO 
2013a). In the case of Mexico, Perry (2008) found that working in the informal sector was 
much more involuntary for the younger population than for adults, while this is not the case in 
Brazil. Bassi, Busso, Urzea and Vargas (2012) claim that one of the problems with 
unemployment among the young population is the low probability of them transitioning from 
an informal to a formal job; a figure that stands at just 10 per cent in Mexico, 15 per cent in 
Argentina and close to 30 per cent in Brazil and Chile. There is little evidence of informality 
rates amongst the older population in Latin America, with the exception of Fedesarrollo 
(2015) which shows a recent important increment among this group in the case of Colombia. 
 
Incidence of informality among women and ethnic minorities 
In Latin America, the incidence of informality is higher for women (50 per cent) than for men 
(45 per cent) (ILO 2013a). However, as explained previously, this does not mean much in 
terms of inclusive growth if it is the result of a choice. In fact, it would be perfectly 
understandable for a woman with children to choose informal work because of the flexibility it 
provides. The Mexican survey, and to a lesser extent in the Brazilian survey, women showed 
a relatively higher preference for informal work (Arias & Bustelo 2007; Arias, Landa & Yañez 
2007). In the case of Colombia, there difference for independent workers is 5 per cent, after 
controlling for other observable characteristics (Bernal 2009). Likewise, Galli & Kucera 
(2008) found that in Latin America women’s behaviour does not differ from men’s in terms of 
counter/pro-cyclicality. Therefore, it is not easy to establish whether the incidence of 
informality among women is source of segregation or a matter of preference. In particular, 
there is a current lack of knowledge on this subject concerning women heads of household 
for whom the decision to work may be less of a choice. 
 
Regarding race segregation, according to Henley, Arabsheibani and Carneiro (2006), in 
Brazil whites and Asians show the lowest rates of informality, whereas mixed races and 
blacks face the highest rates. Similarly, Tokman (2008) claims that countries with larger 
indigenous populations demonstrate higher informality rates. He also searched for bias in the 
labour market against immigrants, but found no support for his hypothesis. Bernal (2009) 
also reported a high incidence of informality among ethnic minorities in Colombia. 
 
In sum, there is a high incidence of informality among vulnerable groups in Latin America 
who seem to perceive informality as a default option to unemployment. This is particularly 
true in the case of the poorly educated, the young, indigenous people and ethnic minorities. 
This finding is important in determining whether informality increases inclusive growth, since 
informality in vulnerable groups is likely to be understood as ‘structural informality’ or 
‘induced informality’, if it is the result of segregation.  
 
Informality as a default option to unemployment in Colombia 
In Colombia, there is no consensus around whether the labour market is segmented or 
integrated. There is some evidence supporting the idea that integrated markets existed 
during the period 1991-1996 and became more segmented after the nineties, a decade 
characterised by increases in payroll taxes and low productivity (Peña 2013; Mondragon, 
Peña & Kugler 2010; Perry 2007; Maloney 2004). These findings corroborate Fiess et al. 
(2008), which shows a high, negative and significant rolling correlation between the 
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economic cycle and informality between1997 and 2002, and no significant correlation in 
subsequent periods. On the other hand, Pratap and Quintin (2004) were unable to find any 
strong evidence of segmentation between the formal and the informal sectors in Colombia. 
Recent literature (Garcia, 2014; Perry, 2008), which understands informality as a mixture of 
integrated and segmented markets, reflects the heterogeneity of the labour market in the 
country11. 
 
Summary 
The question we were trying to address in this section was whether informality in Latin 
American countries can be positive for inclusive growth. We learned that if informality is a 
default and not a voluntary option, and if it is due to low productivity, it can even be positive 
for inclusive growth. In fact, according to Busso, Fazio and Levy (2012) informality employs 
an important segment of the population with low education and/or skills that otherwise would 
not find a job in the formal market because the cost of hiring them is greater than their 
productivity value for the firm. If the government enforces formality, this group will face 
unemployment and will probably end up worse off than when working informally. However, in 
the context of ‘induced informality’, where informal workers demonstrate similar productivity 
than formal workers, permitting informality as an alternative to unemployment only 
represents the second best policy option, the first being to reduce implicit or explicit formal 
market entry restrictions.  
 
The distribution of the three types of informality in each country is not really covered by 
existing literature12, perhaps because even at an individual level structural, induced and 
voluntary informality are not straightforward to identify. In fact, a worker can operate in all 
three types of informality at the same time. Despite this challenge, we were able to gather 
evidence to identify which type of informality prevails in each country. The evidence indicates 
significant heterogeneity across Latin America, not only within countries but also between 
countries and macroeconomic contexts. This finding corroborates recent literature that posits 
informality as a dynamic combination of all three types of informality (Perry et al. 2007; Fies 
et al. 2008; Ulyssea 2013). Despite this uncertainty, and at the risk of over-simplifying, one 
could argue that whereas Mexico shows a higher prevalence of ‘voluntary informality’, 
Colombia seems to have a very heterogeneous mixture of informality. 
 
3.2. Informality may constrain inclusive growth not only by providing a low 
standard of life but also by impacting growth and jobs in the formal sector: a 
literature review 
 
The channels through which informality might constrain inclusive growth are: (i) informal 
employment generates less income, benefits and stability than formal employment; (ii) 
informal sector productivity is lower than formal sector productivity controlled for observable 
characteristics as size, and; (iii) informality erodes the tax base and/or the quantity and/or 
quality of public services. The findings of the previous section also apply here since 
informality is understood as a mixture of ‘structural informality’, where the first hypothesis – 
informality increases inclusive growth -is more relevant, and ‘induced’ and ‘voluntary’ 
informality where the second hypothesis – informality constrains inclusive growth -is more 
relevant.  
 
                                               
11  Garcia (2014) used wages as a criterion for segmentation inside the labour market and found that big cities in Colombia 
tend to show a larger proportion of voluntary informality. However, Perry (2008) argues that wages do not necessarily 
demonstrate segmentation but can in fact signal differences in unobservable characteristics among workers, as well as 
preference for informality. 
12  One exception is Alcaraz, Chiquiarand Salcedo (2012) who found that between 10 and 20per cent of informal workers in 
Mexico demonstrated marked signs of segmentation based on the personal characteristics of individuals. 
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Informal employment generates less income, benefits and stability than formal 
employment 
In general, informal workers are at a disadvantage in terms of earnings when compared with 
formal workers. According to the ILO (2013a), the incidence of informality in Latin America 
reduces from 72 per cent among the lowest earning quintile to 31 per cent among the highest 
earning quintile. Similarly, the incidence of poverty among informal workers is between two 
and five times higher than that of formal workers (Maurizio 2015).  
 
However, this income gap might only reflect different worker productivities due to differences 
between the two sectors in terms of observable characteristics such as education or 
unobservable characteristics such as social skills. Therefore, wage differences between 
formal and informal workers should be controlled by observable characteristics for specific 
sectors of the population or using more sophisticated techniques to control by unobservable 
variables. Controlling by differences in preference for informal work, another possible cause 
of wage differentials, is a more difficult task.  
 
Maurizio (2015) found a positive earning gap in favour of formal jobs in the cases of 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru. This gap tends to decrease with the level of income and 
becomes negative at high-income levels in the case of Chile and Brazil. Similarly, Bargain 
(2010) found that low-income informal self-employed workers face lower earnings than their 
formal sector peers, whereas workers in the high-earning tier of informal self-employment 
receive a significant earning premium, as is the case in Brazil, Mexico and South Africa. 
Perry et al (2008) performed a similar exercise for Argentina, Bolivia and the Dominican 
Republic also finding a positive gap for low-income workers in the cases of Argentina and 
Brazil and a negative gap for high-income workers in Bolivia and high-income self-employed 
workers in Argentina. As for Colombia, Herrera, Lopez & Montellon (2013) found a positive 
income gap in favour of the formal sector for all income quintiles. Also in the case of 
Colombia, Daza and Gamboa (2008) found a gap in favour of formal market earnings 
ranging between 30 per cent and 60 per cent depending on the definition of informality used, 
with small variations over the period 2008 to 2012. 
 
Other than income, there are other advantages to being formally employed versus 
informality, including access to social protection in terms of health benefits and old age 
pension as well as job stability. Even if a worker does not value these perks, for society as a 
whole it is important that workers and their families are protected against these risks. A 
similar argument can be applied to worker training. According to Perry et al (2007), formal 
workers tend to be more satisfied with their jobs in Colombia, however this is not necessarily 
the case in the Dominican Republic or Argentina where formal and informal workers report 
similar levels of welfare. 
 
Informal sector productivity is lower than formal sector productivity controlled by 
observable characteristics  
One of the most powerful arguments against informality is the impact on productivity. 
According to Levy (2008), formal market restrictions are associated with a misallocation of 
firms in favour of small firms that operate more intensively in the informal sector. This occurs 
not only because there is an implicit subsidy to informality but also because informal firms try 
to keep themselves out of the sight of authorities in order to continue being informal. 
According to Levy, the low productivity embodied by informality is not caused by the 
existence of self-employment or family firms, but rather it is due to the existence of too many 
of them. In fact, a small amount of self-employed workers and family firms can have a 
positive impact on informality by completing market functioning.  
 
However, size is not the only cause for differences in productivity. Other factors affecting the 
informal sector include limited access to credit (Dabla-Norris & Koeda 2008), fewer 
incentives to train and adopt technology (Dabla-Norris, Gradstein & Inchauste 2007), a lower 
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probability of engaging in the export market and restricted access to public goods, such as 
the legal system and government labour training schemes. Ydrovo (2010) even suggests that 
informality affects aggregate productivity by weakening the process of creative destruction.  
 
In the case of Mexico, Busso, Fazio and Levy (2012) found that one peso invested in capital 
and labour within formal firms is worth 28 per cent more than if it is invested in illegal firms, 
and 50 per cent more than if it is invested in legal and informal firms13. They also found a 
difference of productivity of 84 per cent in favour of formal firms, controlled by observable 
characteristics. In the case of Brazil, Fajnzylber, Maloney and Montes Rojas (2011) found 
that after the government implemented a policy to lower the cost of operating formally, newly 
created formal firms showed higher levels of revenue and profits and employed more 
workers. Finally, Perry (2008) found that the difference in labour productivity between firms 
that started up informally and firms that have always operated formally is 50 per cent in Peru, 
33 per cent in Mexico, 30 per cent in Bolivia, 30 per cent in Panama and 12 per cent in 
Argentina. The positive productivity difference in favour of formal firms is also supported by 
other research at a Latin American and global level (Hsieh & Klenow 2009; Verdera 2015; 
Porta & Shleifer 2008). 
 
Differences in productivity between the informal and formal sector have been estimated for 
Colombia. Using Matching methods, Cardenas and Mejia (2007) found significant differences 
in firm income per worker after controlling by observable characteristics. Along the same 
lines, Yvodro (2010), who used matching propensity score techniques, found that informal 
firms hire fewer salaried workers, mainly because they face restrictions to growth. As a 
result, aggregate productivity is lower. However, it is important to note that Perry et al. (2007) 
found no significant differences in productivity in Colombia. 
 
Informality erodes the tax base and/or lowers the quantity and/or quality of 
public services and/or increases corruption 
The relationship between tax revenues and informality has also been widely confirmed and 
explained by Levy (2008), Loayza (1997), Perry et al (2007) and Anton (2014). According to 
the classical model of Loayza (1997), higher tax rates generate higher tax revenues but also 
increase informality and therefore an optimal tax rate exists for each economy. The high 
correlation between VAT evasion and informality, shown in most of the literature, supports 
this conclusion. On the other hand, Levy (2008) argues that benefit programmes for informal 
workers demonstrate good intentions but end up encouraging informality, reducing 
productivity and diminishing government funds for social programmes.  
 
Finally, according to De Soto (1989) informal entrepreneurs deviate 10 per cent to 15 per 
cent of their gross income to corruption, whereas formal entrepreneurs pay an average of 
only 1 per cent of gross income in bribes. This behaviour erodes the rule of law and the 
integrity of public institutions. Similarly, informality ends up creating unfair competition for 
formal firms. According to the World Bank Enterprises Survey, 28 per cent of firms worldwide 
report the practices of informal sector competitors as a major constraint to their functioning. 
This percentage amounts to an average of 31 per cent in Latin America, but is as high as 49 
per cent in Brazil, 49.8 per cent in Bolivia and 55 per cent in Colombia. 
 
Summary 
In general, formal workers receive higher income, and particularly in Colombia, tend to be 
more satisfied with their job. The income gap appears to be positive and in favour of the 
formal sector for all levels of income in the case of Colombia and subject to income levels in 
Brazil, Chile and Mexico. These results support the findings of the previous section which 
                                               
13  In this paper the authors define two types of workers: employees, for whom the firm pays social security (legal) and 
freelance contractors for whom the firm does not pay social security (informal). 
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point to an important segment of voluntary informality in Mexico, whereas in Colombia a 
combination of induced and structural informality, and to a lesser extent, voluntary 
informality, can be observed. The important macroeconomic cost that arises from all kinds of 
informality should also be stressed. 
 
3.3. Informality and public policies aimed at improving labour market 
efficiency and inclusive growth: a literature review 
 
In this section we analyse the impact on inclusive growth of public policies aimed at 
improving labour market efficiency, with a special focus on the Colombian tax reform of 2012 
which lowered payroll tax. 
 
Public policy analysis 
The list of policies that have been implemented in different countries worldwide to improve 
inclusive growth through labour market efficiency is long, but can be summarised into the 
following two broad categories. First, policies that address the relationship between 
unemployment, informality and inclusive growth include: (i) promoting entrepreneurship 
through self-employment14; (ii) encouraging firms to formalise from inception (Klapper et al. 
2007); (iii) reducing the barriers to transition from unemployment to formality (Mincer, 
1991)and iv) changing unemployment benefits and subsidies (Bosch & Pretel 2013).  The 
second category relates to policies aimed at facilitating transition from informality to formality 
and include: (i) reducing labour taxes (Slonimczyk 2011); (ii) reducing the minimum wage 
(Muravyev & Oshchepkov 2013); (iii) reducing the regulatory burden of formality (Bettcher, 
Friedl and Marini 2009); (iv) enforcing formality (Almedia & Carneiro 2011); (vi) establishing 
schemes of partial formalisation (ILO 2007), and; (vii) improving support services provided to 
formal firms (Campos, Goldstein & McKenzie 2015), among others.  
 
Inevitably, analysis of these policies must take into account the specific country context. 
Literature indicates that for developing countries, whenever it is assumed that segmented 
markets exist, reducing barriers to entry into the formal sector have a marginal impact on the 
informal sector while regulating and taxing informality have led to increases in unemployment 
and poverty (Porta & Shleifer 2014). Meanwhile, analyses, whenever it is assumed more 
integrated markets exist conclude that reducing entry barriers (such as cutting payroll taxes) 
to formality is an important and useful policy to control informality. Ulyssea (2013), from a 
welfare analysis point of view, and assuming the coexistence of segmented and integrated 
markets for the case of Brazil, shows that it is possible to reduce informality by reducing 
entry costs to the formal sector and dropping payroll taxes. Reducing entry costs improves 
welfare by bringing about a substantial reduction in deadweight losses due to wasteful entry 
costs however the second approach does not because it cuts tax revenue. Similarly, 
enforcing formality in a labour market where voluntary informality exists might have a positive 
impact on welfare because of the new tax revenue, while enforcing formality in a market 
where structural informality exists might have a negative impact on welfare.  
 
Impact of lowering payroll tax on informality 
Although at a global level, the impact of lowering the payroll tax on informality has not been 
as widely analysed as the impact of this policy on unemployment, there are nevertheless 
some important findings in this field. Albrecht et al. (2009), for example, who use a 
theoretical model, found that payroll taxes increase informality particularly if firms are small 
                                               
14  An impact evaluation conducted by CAF in 2013 showed that policies oriented to solve market failures in innovation, 
promote labour, entrepreneurship and skills development, and provide finance were most likely to generate higher 
profits and productivity among the self-employed. Meanwhile, policies targeting vulnerable entrepreneurs with low levels 
of education (who perceive self-employment a default option), have a lower probability of success. According to CAF, 
only one quarter of entrepreneurs in Latin America possesses the characteristics required to grow their firms thereby 
increasing employment and productivity. 
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and able to evade controls. Empirical works, such as Hazans (2011), have found that 
European countries with higher payroll taxes show higher levels of informality and 
Slonimczyk (2011) found that a reduction in payroll taxes in Russia had an important impact 
on informality indicators. As for Latin American, Lora and Fajardo (2012) found that payroll 
taxes increase informality if the workers do not perceive the direct benefits of these 
contributions, as is often the case in the region. 
 
A number of studies analyse the relationship between payroll taxes and informality in 
Colombia. For example, Kugler and Kugler (2009) surveyed a panel of Colombian firms and 
found that an increase of 10 per cent in payroll tax was related to an increase in informal 
employment between 4 per cent and 5 per cent. Similarly, Mondragon et al. (2010) found that 
an increase in 10 per cent of payroll contributions was related to an increased probability of 
informality ranging between 5 and 8 percentage points. However, the impact of the 2012 
reform which reduced payroll tax from 29.5 per cent to 16 per cent is yet to be documented. 
The exception is Anton (2014) who used a general equilibrium model to show that the 2012 
tax reform should bring an increase of formal employment between 3.4 and 3.7 per cent, and 
a decrease in informal employment between 2.9 and 3.4 per cent.  
 
Summary and evidence gaps 
As Heintz (2012) noted, and as is still the case, very few studies analyse informality and 
inclusive growth at a global level. This may be because of the measurement difficulties and 
because of the many different forces involved in this relationship within and among the 
different countries.  
 
However, the perseverance of a large informal sector in Latin America has given rise to a 
multitude of studies supporting the idea that informality constrains inclusive growth, both at 
an individual and macroeconomic level. Based on a review of the most prominent literature 
on these issues, we have identified several channels through which informality not only 
constrains but also promotes inclusive growth. In fact, some evidence suggests that 
informality can benefit vulnerable groups; a point of view that is rarely analysed in existing 
works. 
 
The literature review also revealed considerable heterogeneity among Latin American 
countries with respect to the nature and behaviour of informality. For example, ’voluntary 
informality’ appears to predominate in Mexico, whereas Colombia demonstrates a high but 
very heterogeneous mixture of informality. This makes the country an interesting case study 
because it allows us to test our two first hypotheses simultaneously. Colombia also 
demonstrates regional averages in terms of informality, inclusive growth and the relationship 
between them. Another interesting feature of Colombia is that it is one of the few countries in 
the region that have implemented an active policy to reduce informality. Lessons from this 
experience will be very useful for other countries in the region facing high formal labour 
costs, such as Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica and Mexico (Graph 3.4). Notwithstanding, the 
impact of any policy will vary depending on the specific characteristics of the informality in 
each country.   
 
In terms of specific gaps in the literature, in Latin America there is a lack of evidence around 
whether informality can be understood as a default option for vulnerable groups who would 
otherwise not be able to find a job in the formal sector. In the following sections, we attempt 
to fill this gap, in particular by analysing the role and relevance of informality for the older 
population and women heads of household. With regards to whether informality constrains 
inclusive growth, we will focus our attention on the impacts of formality and informality from 
the point of view of workers, since enterprise analysis implies the use of some problematic 
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databases15. Finally, although the impact of payroll tax on labour markets in Colombia has 
been widely analysed, little is known about the effects of the most recent tax reform which 
reduced payroll taxes. It is expected that analysing this policy will provide relevant insights 
for other regions and African countries that exhibit a combination of high payroll taxes with 
high informality rates. 
 
 
Graph 3.4 
Payroll taxes as a percentage of commercial profits in sub-Saharan and Latin 
American countries (2014) 
 
Source: World Bank2014 World Development Indicators 
 
 
  
                                               
15  Most available data is low quality and not representative at the population level. 
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4. Informality and inclusive growth in 
Colombia 
 
In this section we present an analysis of the channels through which informality can promote 
and constrain inclusive growth in Colombia. We also review national policies aimed at 
reducing informality, in particular, the 2012 payroll tax reform.  
 
In most of the analysis that follows, we refer to two consecutive national household surveys 
provided by the Department of Statistics (Dane); and the panel survey by the Universidad de 
los Andes. These are the Encuesta Continua de Hogares (Continuous Household Survey) 
(ECH 2002-2006) for urban households and the Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares 
(Widescale Integrated Household Survey) (GEIH 2007-2015) for urban households in 13 
metropolitan areas, representing 60 per cent of the total urban population according to the 
2005 census16. These are representative surveys; however they do not have a panel 
structure. In order to be able to analyse additional variables not included in the GEIH, we 
also refer to the Encuesta Longitudinal Colombiana de la Universidad de los Andes 
(Longitudinal Survey of Colombia by the Andes University) (ELCA 2010-2013). The ELCA, 
although not statistically representative, was gathered from around 5,000 urban households 
per year and was applied in a panel structure. In this chapter we mostly use the ILO5 firm 
definition for informality. However, when we refer to the ELCA, we classify informal workers 
as those who do not contribute either to state health or pension systems, the legal definition 
most used in Colombia. This decision is due to data limitations in estimating the firm 
definition. The information analysed in sections 4.1 and 4.2 of this chapter correspond to 
averages between April, May and June 2015, unless otherwise stated. In section 4.3, the 
period of analysis is adjusted in order to estimate the impact of the 2012 payroll tax reform. 
 
4.1. Analysis of the channels through which informality might promote 
inclusive growth in Colombia (hypothesis 1) 
 
In this section, we analyse whether informality acts as a substitute to unemployment in 
Colombia drawing on surveys, reports, figures of incidence of informality among vulnerable 
groups, transition matrices and analysis of counter-cyclical movements of informal 
employment. As is the general trend across Latin America, income gaps between 
unemployment and informality are not an issue in Colombia in so far as there are no sound 
unemployment benefits.  
 
Drivers of informality 
According to a special report of the 2006 GEIH17, 59 per cent of informal self-employed and 
60 per cent of the informal salaried workers in Colombia would prefer to have a job in the 
formal sector at the same salary or less. Similarly, 55 per cent of self-employed workers 
reported the impossibility of finding a salaried job as the main reason why they were 
engaged in the informal sector. Table 4.1 presents these statistics by socio-economic sector 
according to the GEIH and similar results obtained in the ELCA18. As can be observed, all the 
groups that we have identified as vulnerable are likely to report this reason - inability to find a 
                                               
16  The GEIH, which is conducted annually in 13 metropolitan areas, gathers information on more than 30 thousand 
households per month. We opted not to use the GEIH sample that covers 23 cities with rural areas since the 13 
metropolitan area sample covers a longer period of time, with each month representative at a metropolitan area level. 
The11 remaining cities are only representative when analysed per semester. Furthermore, the 13cities sample is more 
frequently used by Colombian authorities 
17  The 2006 report on informality is not available online. Reported by Bernal (2009) and Perry (2008). 
18  Results are not totally comparable since the GEIH (2006) asks for the two main reasons and the ELCA for the main 
reason.  
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salaried job in the formal sector - as a principal cause for their self-employment status. The 
older population also reported ‘obtaining an additional income’ as an important reason for 
informality. These results show that, in the case of Colombia, an important portion of the 
informal population reports informality as being a default option to unemployment. Informality 
thus represents the best option for individuals whose personal characteristics, such as low 
education, mean they are unable to secure a job in the formal sector. However, for those 
individuals who meet the basic requirements for formal employment but are unable to enter 
into the formal sector due to high barriers, then informality may represent the second best 
option.  
 
Incidence of informality among workers with low education, skills and experience 
In this and the next section we analyse informality among different socio-economic groups, 
and particularly among the most vulnerable, to explore whether informality is a default option 
to unemployment for them and why the formal market is not an option. A high incidence of 
informality among workers with low levels of education and experience who live in cities with 
low productivity will indicate a large incidence of subsistence informality, whereas a large 
incidence of informality among women and ethnic minorities will indicate that informality is 
the result of discrimination. Exploring this hypothesis will allow us to establish the relationship 
between informality and inclusive growth. Table 4.2 shows the relevant rates and shares for 
different socio-economic groups. This analysis also makes use of the statistics presented in 
Table 4.1 in order to assess the extent to which each socio-economic group enters into 
informality voluntarily.  
 
Education  
Education is the area where the largest differences among the socio-economic groups can 
be observed. The informality rate among workers with primary education or less is 79 per 
cent, compared with 23 per cent among workers with tertiary education. The average years 
of education among informal workers are 8.6 in comparison with 10.5 among the 
unemployed and 12.4 years among formal workers. These indicators show that an important 
segment of the population has such low levels of education that it is highly unlikely that they 
would find a job in the formal sector, which is consistent with previous results presented in 
this section. This finding underlines the importance of improving education as a mean to 
reduce informality, as was the case in Brazil (Haanwinckel et al. 2014).  
 
On the other hand, the share of informal workers with technical and/or university studies is 
17 per cent, indicating that another important segment of the population is informal despite 
their high level of education. The unemployment rate of this group is almost the same as the 
national average, probably because they are more likely to be able to afford being 
unemployed. This and the fact that the low, medium and high-educated population are 
equally represented in the unemployed group, suggests that the level of education might be 
more correlated with informality than with unemployment. 
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None Primary Secondary College Male Female
Higher pay 9.6 4.3 7.4 11.4 17 11.5 6.6
More flexible hours 13.8 6.1 10.7 17 21.5 9 21.4
Due to his/her age 22.9 34.2 27.2 18.2 15.9 21.2 25.6
More stability or 
better future
1.9 0.7 1.7 2 4 2.2 1.6
Better prospects 4.1 2.3 3.6 5.2 8.6 4.6 4.6
Wishes to own 
his/her own firm
4.6 2.3 3.6 5.2 8.6 4.6 4.6
Less responsibility 2.4 2.2 2.5 2.5 1.6 2.2 2.6
Does not like having 
a boss
8.6 7.9 8.8 8.8 8.4 9.8 6.8
Family tradition 5.7 8.7 7.6 4 3 7 3.8
Inherited the 
business
1.3 18.8 1.7 0.9 0.3 1.7 0.8
Is used to working 
independently
15.6 7.9 17.9 14.1 10.2 18.2 11.5
Other reasons 10.4 7.9 10.8 20.3 52.8 7.4 12.6
Was fired has not 
found another job
4.7 2.6 3.5 5.6 8.3 5.2 3.9
Only job he/she 
could get
54.9 60.1 58 54.9 41.1 54.9 54.6
EL
CA
 2
01
3
Only job he/she 
could get
28.7 35.7 34.1 27.6 19.9 31.6 25.9
Less than 15 15-18 19-24* 25-44 45+**
Higher pay 1.3 2.7 8.9 11.7 7.9
More flexible hours 16.9 14 16.3 17.2 9.8
Due to his/her age 32.2 26.5 2.3 9.1 41
More stability or 
better future
0 0.6 1.3 2.5 1.5
Better prospects 0.8 0.8 4.1 5.3 3
Wishes to own 
his/her own firm
0.8 3.8 4.3 5.8 3.4
Less responsibility 2.4 3.4 2.8 2.5 2.1
Does not like having 
a boss
4.2 4.8 8.1 9.8 7.7
Family tradition 8.1 4.4 5.3 4.8 6.8
Inherited the 
business
0.2 0.8 1.4 1.3 1.5
Is used to working 
independently
0.8 3.9 11.3 15.5 17.3
Other reasons 15.7 17.3 13.2 11.1 8.8
Was fired has not 
found another job
0 1.2 3.6 5.4 4.4
Only job he/she 
could get
56.1 68.7 68.6 57.4 48.8
EL
CA
 
20
13
Only job he/she 
could get
31.7 28.4 28.8 32.2 35.2
Table 4.1
Drivers of Informality in Colombia. Motivations of informal self-employed workers by socio-demographic characteristics (% 
of answers)
Source: Bernal (2009), ELCA (2013), and own calculations. In the GEIH 2007-2015, the values correspond to the percentage of 
options checked by respondents since the two responses per questions were permitted. The ELCA 2010-2013 asked respondents to 
identify the main reason for informality.    
* 17-24 for ELCA  ** 65+ for ELCA  
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Table 4.2  
Rates and shares in the Colombian labour market 
   Labour market ratios   
  
Unemployment Informality Formality 
Economic 
inactivity 
Participation  
rate 
Total population 9.9% 48.6% 51.4% 32.0% 68% 
Women 12% 52% 48% 39% 61% 
Men 8% 46% 54% 24% 76% 
Women heads of 
household 6% 55% 45% 32% 68% 
Younger than 15 5% 92% 8% 95% 5% 
Young (15-24) 20% 42% 58% 43% 57% 
Young adult (25-35) 10% 35% 65% 11% 89% 
Young adult (36-45) 7% 46% 54% 10% 90% 
Adult (46-60) 7% 59% 41% 20% 80% 
Older than 60 4% 76% 24% 66% 34% 
Primary education or 
less 7% 79% 21% 42% 58% 
Secondary education 10% 69% 31% 51% 49% 
Higher education 11% 50% 50% 23% 77% 
Technical or university 
education 10% 23% 77% 20% 80% 
Years of education 10.5 8.6 12.4 8.1 9.7 
  Representation among different socio-economic groups  
  
  
Unemployed Informal  Formal  
Economically 
inactive 
% of total working-age 
population 
Women 57% 49% 43% 64% 53% 
Men 43% 51% 57% 36% 47% 
Women heads of 
household 12% 16% 13% 14% 14% 
Younger than 15 0% 1% 0% 16% 5% 
Young 15-24 36% 14% 18% 29% 21% 
Young adult (25-35) 29% 20% 35% 7% 21% 
Young adult (36-45) 14% 21% 23% 5% 16% 
Adult (46-60) 18% 32% 21% 13% 21% 
Older than 60 3% 12% 4% 30% 15% 
Primary education or 
less 13% 30% 8% 28% 21% 
Secondary education 15% 21% 9% 33% 21% 
Higher education 34% 31% 30% 19% 27% 
Technical or university 
education 38% 17% 54% 19% 31% 
 
Source: Own calculations based on GEIH 2007-2015 
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Age – experience 
Age is commonly used as a proxy for experience. According to Table 4.2, the young 
population19 tends to have high informality and unemployment rates (42 per cent and 20 per 
cent, respectively) whereas the older population has higher informality and lower 
unemployment (76 per cent and 4 per cent, respectively). Both groups have low participation 
rates. The differences in informality rates can be partially explained by the fact that the young 
population has studied 10.6 years on average, whereas the older population has studied an 
average of 6.8 years. As we suggested before, education seems to be more strongly 
correlated with informality than with unemployment. Another possible explication is that, 
according to Table 4.1, the older population tends to have stronger preferences for informal 
work than the younger population.  
 
Graph 4.1 
Informality by metropolitan area in Colombia 
 
Source: Own calculations based on GEIH 2007-2015 
 
 
Differences between metropolitan areas  
The probability of working in the formal sector very much depends on the city where one 
lives. While the informality rate is close to 45 per cent in big cities such as Bogotá and 
Medellin, it is more than 70 per cent in Cucuta, and even higher in some rural areas. 
Moreover, as shown in Graph 4.1, cities with a higher ratio of average wage to minimum 
wage demonstrate lower informality rates. This supports claims made by Mondragon et al. 
(2010) around the advantages of setting minimum wages closer to productivity levels. This 
also supports the findings of Hazans (2011) for Europe, according to which countries where 
minimum wages are set at a regional level how higher informality rates than those where 
minimum wages are fixed by central government. Based on this evidence, Fedesarrollo 
(2013 and 2014) has recently proposed a minimum wage at regional level in Colombia. 
Another option for the country is to set a minimum wage by sector, as in the case in South 
Africa, or to return to the rural/urban minimum wages that existed in Colombia in the past. 
Nevertheless, the implications of this measure on income distribution are still being 
                                               
19  The young population includes people between12 and 24 years old, young adults are people between 24 and 35 years 
of age and the older population includes individuals over 60 years old. 
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discussed. According to Graph 4.1, there are other forces that govern the distribution of 
informality among cities. For example, Pasto and Cucuta are situated close to the border and 
the local economy is thus impacted by smuggling. Consequently, these cities demonstrate 
higher levels of informality than could be expected based on productivity levels. 
 
Graph 4.2 
Informality and skin colour 
 
Source: Own calculations based on ELCA 2013 
*Includes informal workers making health and pension contributions 
 
 
Incidence of informality among women and ethnic minorities 
 
Gender  
As of June 2015, the unemployment rate among women was 12 per cent and 8 per cent 
among men and the informality rate was 52 per cent among women and 46 per cent among 
men. These figures show some bias against women in the labour market in spite of the fact 
that the levels of education are similar between both genders. As expected, the inactivity rate 
is much higher among women (39 per cent) than men (24 per cent).Women are also over-
represented among the unemployed (57 per cent) and the informal (52 per cent), while they 
are slightly under-represented among formal workers (48 per cent) (Table 4.2). 
 
Women heads of household are perhaps one of the most vulnerable groups in society. 
According to the 2005 Colombian census, women headed 25 per cent of the all households 
and this is a growing tendency. The unemployment rate of this group is just 6 per cent while 
their informality rate stands at 55 per cent; compared with national averages of 9.9 per cent 
and 48.6 per cent, respectively. This low rate of unemployment and high rate of informality is 
consistent with the high percentage of self-employed women who are head households and 
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who report difficulties in finding an alternative salaried job. This suggests that an important 
portion of this group cannot afford to be unemployed.  
 
Ethnic minorities 
In the 2005 census, around 14 per cent of the population declared itself as belonging to an 
ethnic minority: 10.6 per cent as Afro-Colombians and 3.4 per cent as indigenous. The GEIH 
does not ask questions related to ethnicity, however using the 2006 special report on 
informality, Bernal (2009) found that the probability of working in the informal sector is 5.4 
percentage points higher for indigenous people and 2.2 percentage points higher for Afro-
Colombians, controlled by other observable characteristics. Similarly, informality rates 
estimated using the ELCA survey suggest that the incidence of informality decreases as skin 
colour gets lighter, as shown in Graph 4.2. In the case of ethnic minorities there does not 
appear to be any specific reason for informality other than being unable to find a job in the 
formal sector. In fact, Bernal (2009) also found that ethnic minorities are 8 per cent more 
likely to prefer a formal job than the rest of the self-employed population. This is corroborated 
by the fact that a relatively high percentage of ethnic minorities reported being self-employed 
because they couldn’t find a salaried job. 
 
Summary of differences in observable characteristics 
In Colombia, informal employment is over-represented among women heads of household, 
the older and young populations, ethnic minorities, poorly educated individuals and border 
city workers. If all individuals with at least two of the previous characteristics are categorised 
as ‘vulnerable’20, this group would account for 11 per cent of the working-age urban 
population. The high rate of informality of this group, 78 per cent, cannot be explained by 
specific high preferences for self-employment, since we observed that they reported even 
higher preferences for salaried work than the rest of the population21. Furthermore, 
informality on this specific group does not appear to be caused by barriers to formality. In 
fact, given low productivity levels amongst vulnerable groups22, it would be very difficult for 
these workers to find a job in the formal market even if formal market restrictions were 
drastically reduced. Taking all this evidence into account, we can assert that in Colombia 
informality is a default option to unemployment and promotes inclusive growth at an 
individual level among vulnerable groups. 
 
Using the information gathered in this section, we also estimated the probability of formality. 
As shown in Table 4.3, all the coefficients obtained from the logit demonstrate the expected 
signs. The groups that we have identified as vulnerable demonstrate low odds ratios, which 
means that they have lower probabilities of working in the formal sector, whereas men, 
household heads, young adults, workers with higher education and inhabitants of Bogotá, 
Medellin and Cali are more likely to work in the formal sector. According to Table 4.1, this 
high tier group also reported higher preferences for informal jobs related to factors such as 
higher pay, more flexible hours and being their own boss. 
 
                                               
20  Excluding ethnic minorities, if we classify as ‘vulnerable’ all those individuals who show at least one of these 
characteristics the size of the group would amount to half of the national population and their informality rate would be 
58 per cent. 
21  With the only exception of the older population. 
22  The average earnings of this vulnerable population groups are 33 per cent lower than the average earnings of the 
informal worker and 30 per cent lower than the minimum wage. 
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How frequent are transitions between groups? Is informality a buffer to 
unemployment and/or a step towards formality? 
Another characteristic which allows us to identify whether informal workers are integrated 
with the unemployed or with formal workers is to analyse the frequency of transitions 
between groups. In doing so, we use the ELCA survey which provides panel data for 2010 
and 2013. According to Table 4.4, the probability of remaining informal in 2013 for workers 
who were informal in 2010 is 72 per cent. For formal workers in 2010, the probability of 
remaining in formal employment in 2013 is also 72 per cent. This shows a high degree of 
persistence of both informality and formality in Colombia. For several reasons, including 
methodological ones, our calculations show that people are less likely to remain 
unemployed. Table 4.4 shows that informality does not necessarily lead on to a formal job 
because the probability of transitioning to formal employment from informal employment is 
just 14 per cent; lower than the probability of transitioning to formality from unemployment 
(19 per cent). However, informality might be a buffer to unemployment because the 
probability of transitioning from formal to informal employment is 20 per cent, which is higher 
than the probability of transitioning from formal employment to unemployment (3 per cent).  
 
We also analysed transition matrices for different segments of the population. As we can see 
in Table 4.5, the persistence of men in the formal sector is higher than persistence in the 
informal sector for men. The same is true for the highly educated population and young 
adults. In contrast, the persistence of women and poorly educated workers is higher in 
informality than in formal jobs. In the case of the older population persistence in the formal 
and informal sectors is the same at 72 per cent, which is the same persistence rate of the 
population as a whole. Table 4.5 also shows that persistence in any segment of the market - 
unemployment, informality or formality - is higher for men than for women. In other words, 
men tend to transit less than women across different statuses. It is also possible to observe 
in Table 4.5 that the probability of transitioning from informality to formality is higher for men 
Table 4.3 
Logit model. Dependent variable: probability of formality 
  Odds ratio Std error z Sig. 
Male 1.5 0.0 388 *** 
Head of household 1.3 0.0 218 *** 
Women Head of 
household 
1.0 0.0 -12 ** 
15-24 years 1.2 0.0 162 *** 
25-35 years 1.4 0.0 299 *** 
45-60 years 0.7 0.0 -329 *** 
60+ years 0.4 0.0 -550 *** 
Less than primary 0.2 0.0 -301 *** 
Primary 0.5 0.0 -646 *** 
Higher 2.3 0.0 530 *** 
Technical or 
university 
2.4 0.0 508 *** 
Big city 1.6 0.0 506 *** 
Border city 0.6 0.0 -222 *** 
Constant 0.4 0.0 -695 *** 
LR chi2(13) 7507820       
Prob> chi2 0 
  
  
Pseudo R2 0.1697       
 
Source: Own calculations based on GEIH 2007-2015 
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than women, higher for young and young adults than for the older population, and higher for 
highly educated workers than for workers with primary education or less. In contrast, the 
probability of transitioning from formality to informality is higher for women, for older workers 
and for less educated workers. In every group of workers, however, the probability of 
transitioning from formal employment to unemployment is much lower than probability of 
moving from formal to informal employment.  
 
 
 
Table 4.5 
Transition matrices by gender 
 
Source: Own calculations based on ELCA 2013 
 
 
Transitions in and out the labour force are also interesting. According to the ELCA, 26 per 
cent of the inactive population in 2010 entered the labour force through informality in 2013, 
and 27 per cent of the unemployed population became inactive in 2013. The former is mostly 
the result of young individuals becoming active, but unable to find a formal job. The latter 
could be the result of people getting tired of looking for a job or it taking too long to find 
employment, which is consistent with high numbers of individuals with higher education 
becoming unemployed.  
 
  
Unemployed Informal Formal Inactive Unemployed Informal Formal Inactive
Unemployed 14% 38% 17% 31% Unemployed 27% 30% 24% 19%
Informal 6% 68% 9% 17% Informal 3% 75% 17% 5%
Formal 3% 22% 65% 9% Formal 3% 17% 77% 3%
Inactive 5% 26% 3% 66% Inactive 2% 24% 7% 68%
Unemployed Informal Formal Inactive Unemployed Informal Formal Inactive
Unemployed 18% 35% 19% 27% Unemployed 13% 36% 20% 31%
Informal 4% 72% 14% 10% Informal 4% 68% 20% 8%
Formal 3% 20% 72% 6% Formal 5% 16% 76% 4%
Inactive 4% 26% 3% 67% Inactive 10% 40% 5% 44%
Unemployed Informal Formal Inactive Unemployed Informal Formal Inactive
Unemployed 20% 40% 9% 30% Unemployed 11% 30% 14% 45%
Informal 5% 73% 10% 12% Informal 2% 66% 26% 6%
Formal 2% 31% 60% 7% Formal 1% 12% 83% 4%
Inactive 4% 21% 1% 74% Inactive 2% 30% 11% 57%
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
0
2013 2013
Young	and	young	adults	(15-35)
Male
Tertiary	education
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
0
Female
Older	population	(60+)
Elementary	education	or	less
Table 4.4 
Transition matrix 
 
Source: Own calculations based on ELCA 2013 
Unemployed Informal Formal Inactive
Unemployed 18% 35% 19% 27%
Informal 4% 72% 14% 10%
Formal 3% 20% 72% 6%
Inactive 4% 26% 3% 67%
2
0
1
0
2013
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The main conclusion here is that informality promotes inclusive growth insofar as it acts as a 
buffer to unemployment, yet at the same time it can also constrain inclusive growth due to 
the difficulty of moving from informal to formal sector jobs. It was also found that there are 
asymmetries in these transitions, with vulnerable groups more prone to transit from formality 
to informality, and less likely to use informality as a step towards finding a formal job. This 
analysis assumes that the transition from informality of formality promotes inclusive growth, 
which is the subject of discussion in subsequent sections.  
 
Is informality a buffer to unemployment? 
The counter-cyclicality of informality is not only important as a benefit of informality itself but 
also because it is very much related to the question of how voluntary or involuntary informal 
employment is and therefore whether informality promotes or constrains inclusive growth. 
The left-hand panel of Graph 4.3 shows that there is a positive relationship between the 
formality rate23 and the economic cycle, measured as the relative difference between 
observed and potential GDP. The correlation coefficient between the formality rate and the 
output gap is 0.74 for the ILO10 series and 0.74 for the ILO5 series until 2013. These results 
support the hypothesis pertaining to the counter-cyclicality of informal employment in 
Colombia. 
  
The positive relationship between the economic cycle and the formality rate does not 
necessarily imply causality between economic growth and formality. It can be argued that 
high rates of economic growth can be a consequence of low informality. In order to isolate 
this type of double causation, we plotted the relationship between the formality rate and the 
value of commodity exports as a percentage of GDP trend in the right-hand side of Graph 
4.3. Commodity exports represent a good proxy for the economic cycle since they are 
exogenous to informality and well correlated with the output gap24. The correlation coefficient 
between formality and commodity exports is 0.73 for the ILO10 series and 0.63 for the ILO5 
series. Therefore, we can claim that the formality rate in Colombia is in general pro-cyclical 
and the informality rate is in general counter-cyclical, which is consistent with having a 
significant portion of involuntary informal workers amongst whom informality can increase 
inclusive growth.  It also supports the idea of informality being a buffer to unemployment 
during crisis.  
 
However, as shown in Graph 4.3, the most recent years show an important increase in 
formality rates that cannot be explained by the economic cycle. In fact, the correlation 
coefficient between ILO5 and both measures of the output gap, drop to 0.43if we include the 
years 2014 and 2015. As we will later demonstrate, this might be related with the 2012 
payroll tax reform. In other words, a relaxation of formal market rigidities might have resulted 
in more pro-cyclical behaviour of the informal sector. 
 
Is informal employment a substitute to unemployment? 
Based on evidence reviewed, informality appears to represent a substitute to unemployment 
for the cyclically and structurally unemployed. In other words, informality represents the only 
alternative option for vulnerable groups and it is difficult to argue against the idea that 
informality promotes inclusive growth through this channel. However, for the segment of the 
population with at least secondary school studies, informality may represent a constraint 
rather than a step towards inclusive growth. The following section explores these issues 
further. 
  
                                               
23  Defined as one minus the informality rate.Note that the formality rate is calculated for two different ILO 
methodologies/series since one includes firms with less than 10 workers (ILO10 2010) and the other includes firms with 
less than 5 workers (ILO5). 
24  See Fernandez, Villar & Sánchez (2015). 
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Analysis of the channels through which informality might constrain inclusive 
growth in Colombia (hypothesis 2) 
To evaluate whether informality constrains inclusive growth by impacting growth and jobs in 
the formal sector, we analyse data from household surveys which allow us to explore 
whether informal employment implies lower productivity and generates lower income, 
benefits and stability than formal employment. Other channels that we have identified, but 
shall not investigate here, relate to whether: informality generates lower labour productivity 
according to firms; informality lowers tax revenues and/or the quantity and/or quality of public 
services, and; informality increases corruption. We have opted not to explore these channels 
further since they are already well documented in existing literature and require different sets 
of data than the ones we use here.  
 
Does informal employment generate lower income, benefits and stability than 
formal employment? 
Average income of formal workers is almost double the average income of informal workers 
in Colombia. However, this gap might be related to differences in individual characteristics, 
such as education, gender and city of work, amongst others, as demonstrated in the previous 
section. With the caveats explained in the literature review25, we calculated a Matching model 
for comparing workers’ income controlled by observable characteristics, with the formal 
sector as a treatment group and informal workers as the control group. As shown in Table 
4.6, the average income of the formal sector before the matching was two times the average  
  
                                               
25  Wage differences between formal and informal workers should be taken with care when used because they can reflect 
differences in preferences for informal work or other unobservable variables, which can be partially controlled by 
dividing the sample in socio-economic groups.  
Graph 4.3 
Formality rate and output gap in Colombia. Formality rate and commodity exports 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own calculations, Mondragon et al. 2010, Fedesarrollo and World Bank 2014World Development 
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income in the informal sector, however once controlled by observable characteristics, or 
matched, the wage gap lowered to 1.5 times26. Table 4.7 shows the test that confirms the 
quality of the matching27. 
 
 
 
  
                                               
26  The logit model and the p-score that we used to do the matching are the same as those used in the previous section. 
The method used to match the p-scores of the informal workers with those of the formal workers is the kernel method – 
Epanechnikov - which has the advantage of using most of the observations and reducing the variance.Leuven and 
Sianesi (2003) developed the Stata code used in this exercise. 
27  We tested the quality of matching according to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985), which stipulates that the standardised 
bias should be less than 5 per cent. Although the bias was large for the unmatched co-variables (U in Table 4.6), after 
matching (M) all the control variables complied with this criterion. The average standard bias that is what really matters 
since we are working with p-scores is only 1.6 per cent. 
Table 4.6 
Differences in income, stability and satisfaction in Colombia before and after 
adjusting by observable characteristics 
    Formal Informal Ratio T-stat 
Labour income Unmatched 1308440 644807 2.0 49.4 
  Matched 1308440 846798 1.5 30.4 
Stability Unmatched 80% 66% 1.2 30.8 
  Matched 80% 67% 1.2 20.4 
Work satisfaction Unmatched 78% 68% 1.1 21.4 
  Matched 78% 67% 1.2 18.2 
Health benefits Unmatched 97% 90% 1.1 28.2 
  Matched  97% 88% 1.1 21.7 
Differences in labour income per group 
    Formal Informal Ratio T-stat 
Primary 
education or less Unmatched 780023 516648 1.5 19.9 
  ATT* 780023 607136 1.3 13.0 
Secondary 
education Unmatched 858356 672035 1.3 15.7 
  ATT 858466 713981 1.2 11.5 
Tertiary 
education or 
more Unmatched 1703256 913491 1.9 19.5 
  ATT 1703413 972054 1.8 23.1 
Older population Unmatched 1673901 646982 2.6 33.4 
  ATT 1673901 960047 1.7 17.2 
Women Head of 
Household 
Unmatched 1369093 519175 2.6 28.1 
ATT 1369093 765452 1.8 15.7 
 
Source: Own calculations, based on GEIH first quarter 2015 
* Average treatment on the treated, the effect of the programme on the treatment group minus the situation of the 
treatment group if the individuals of the treatment group had not been participants of the programme. 
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The lower panel of Table 4.6 presents the unmatched and the adjusted comparisons in 
income between formal and informal workers by education, gender and age. Performing this 
disaggregated matching helps to reduce the bias generated by unobservable characteristics. 
We find that income is always higher for formal than for informal workers. However, the 
differences between unmatched and adjusted income are higher for women and the older 
population, as well as for the low educated group. This last result confirms findings by 
Herrera et al. (2013) and Nuñez (2002) regarding the disadvantages of having lower levels of 
education in the Colombian labour market. 
 
 
Nevertheless, income might not be the only reason to look for a formal job. For example, 
formal jobs tend to be more stable than informal jobs. As can be observed in Table 4.6, 80 
per cent of formal workers consider that their job is stable compared to 66 per cent of 
informal workers. These numbers are quite similar after adjusting by observable 
characteristics. Similarly, other benefits might provide work satisfaction other than income 
and stability, such as flexibility and the satisfaction of being the own boss.  As the results 
Table 4.7 
Fitting the matching model (probability of formality) 
    Mean   
Variable 
 
Test Control 
%bias 
(std) 
Male U 56% 50% 11.60 
  M 56% 56% -1.40 
Head of 
Household 
U 44% 48% -7.10 
M 44% 44% -0.40 
Women Head of 
Household 
U 13% 18% -14.20 
M 13% 13% 0.20 
15-24 years U 18% 13% 12.30 
  M 18% 19% -2.50 
25-35 years U 33% 19% 32.00 
  M 33% 31% 5.70 
45-60 years U 22% 32% -24.40 
  M 22% 23% -3.10 
60+ years U 4% 13% -33.40 
  M 4% 4% 0.50 
Less than primary 
U 0% 3% -21.90 
M 0% 0% 0.30 
Primary U 7% 28% -57.30 
  M 7% 7% 0.70 
Secondary U 55% 16% 86.70 
  M 55% 54% 1.30 
Technical or 
university U 46% 12% 81.70 
  M 46% 45% 2.70 
Big city U 36% 27% 21.20 
  M 36% 36% 0.60 
Border city U 10% 14% -13.70 
  M 10% 9% 1.20 
Average (p-score) U     32.10 
  M     1.60 
 
Source: Own calculations, based on GEIH 2007-2015 
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show, 78 per cent of formal workers are satisfied with their jobs whereas the rate of 
satisfaction is only 67 per cent among informal workers, after adjusting by observable 
characteristics. Table 4.6 also shows that informal workers have high rates of health 
coverage at 88 per cent, compared with 97 per cent of formal workers. This does not 
necessarily mean that informal workers are contributing to the health system, since they may 
receive benefit from the subsidised scheme. This result suggests that the size and quality of 
the welfare state in Colombia plays an important mediating role in the effect of informality on 
inequality with the formal sector.  
 
In sum, we find a positive income gap in favour of formal employment. However, as stated in 
the literature review, this difference should be analysed with care since it does not 
necessarily imply that workers in the formal sector are better-off than informal workers. The 
gap can also imply differences in unobservable characteristics or preferences for 
formal/informal work. Analysing the results by groups of individuals can reduce, though not 
remove, this discrepancy. In general, formal works also provide more satisfaction, health 
coverage and stability than informal jobs. 
 
Is informal employment associated with lower labour productivity than formal 
employment? 
It is possible to analyse productivity differences between formal and informal firms with the 
household surveys by using labour income as a proxy for labour productivity. We replicated 
the previous exercise controlling not only by observable characteristics but also by firm size. 
We also applied the definition of informality that measures health contributions in order to 
avoid including firm size, the new control variable, in the definition of the treatment group. As 
shown in Table 4.8, the productivity ratio between formal and informal firms is 1.5, after 
controlling for firm size and worker observable characteristics28.  
 
 
Summary 
Formal jobs seem to generate higher income, satisfaction and stability than informal 
employment. In particular, much higher wage differentials are observable for vulnerable 
groups in the formal and the informal sectors. However, these findings should be interpreted 
with care given the difficulty of controlling for unobservable characteristics. The results also 
show that informal workers, particularly more vulnerable groups, receive less income and are 
not as protected against shocks, which implies a constraint on inclusive growth.  
 
                                               
28  Unfortunately the average mean grows up to 6.5, which is on the higher side. Changing the specification, we obtained 
the same results and a better matching, however we preferred to maintain the co-variables used in all the exercises for 
consistency. 
Table 4.8 
Differences in labour income* after adjusting by observable characteristics and size 
    Formal Informal Ratio T-stat 
Controlling for size 
only 
Unmatched 1,323,776 576,290 2.3 56.0 
ATT 1,323,776 709,176 1.9 28.6 
Controlling for size 
and observable 
characteristics 
Unmatched 1,323,776 576,290 2.3 56.0 
ATT 1,314,642 858,766 1.5 20.0 
 
Source: Own calculations, based on GEIH first quarter of 2015 
*Understood as marginal productivity 
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Given the fact that formal firms are generally bigger than informal firms, these results can be 
partially explained by size. However, we repeated the exercise and found that the 
conclusions remain the same after controlling for size, which also provides some evidence in 
favour of productivity differences between formal and informal firms. This reinforces what we 
learned from the literature review in terms of the macroeconomic costs of informality, such as 
tax evasion, unfair competition and higher corruption. It should be kept in mind that although 
informality can be positive in terms of inclusive growth for some vulnerable groups, the cost 
of informality at a society level should not be ignored. These costs might only become visible 
when informality accounts for a large portion of the working population and is more difficult to 
control. 
 
4.2. Policy analysis in Colombia: the impact of lowering payroll tax 
(hypothesis 3) 
 
The Colombian government recently reformed the tax law by reducing payroll contributions 
from 29.5 per cent to 16 per cent and substituting them with a profit tax. This substitution only 
affects the payments made by the employers of workers that earn wages between one and 
ten times the minimum wage, and does not change the amount of taxes or contributions 
payable by the workers. Passing and implementing the law involved several milestones. 
Most of the discussions were held between October and November 2012, the law was 
approved in December 2012, some of the reductions in contributions became effective in 
May 2013 and the reform was fully implemented on 1st January 2014. 
 
The period following the reform coincided with an important reduction in informality rates. 
However, it also coincided with high economic growth rates and a significant reduction in 
unemployment rates. It is therefore of great interest to investigate whether the recent 
reduction in informality, from 51 per cent in 2012 to 48.3 per cent in 2015, was due to high 
rates of growth or to the tax reform; and therefore, whether informality will continue to drop in 
the current climate of low economic growth, which has resulted from a reduction in export 
commodity prices and a general economic deceleration among South American economies.  
 
The impact of payroll tax reform on informality  
One of the most adequate methodologies for isolating the impact of growth over time is the 
Differences in Differences method. Slonimczyk (2011) uses this technique to analyse the 
impact of a tax reform in Russia. The method involves dividing the population into two 
groups: one affected by the reform, the treatment group, and the other unaffected by the 
reform, the control group. The change in probability of informality within the control group is 
then compared with the change observed in the probability of informality within the treatment 
group. By taking the difference between these changes –or the difference in differences- one 
isolates factors that affect both groups simultaneously, such as macroeconomic conditions, 
assuming that the impact on informality is evenly spread between both groups. As Todd 
(1999) claims, the advantage of this methodology compared to a cross-section analysis is 
that it allows for time-invariant unobservable differences between the treatment and the 
control groups. 
 
As a first step, we performed this exercise for the case of Colombia, using the following 
equation and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
 
INFit = θt + Xitβ + ψTimet + μTreatedi + α(Treatmenti × Timet) + uit  
where Xit refers to the observable characteristics, Time is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of zero in the baseline period and a value of one in the period after the reform, and 
Treatment is a dummy that takes the value of one if the individual is from the treatment group 
and zero if not. The treatment group includes all workers that were directly impacted by the 
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reduction in payroll taxes29. The control group includes all other workers. In our baseline 
estimations, we excluded self-employed and public sector employees in order to reduce 
differences between the control and treatment groups in terms of unobservable 
characteristics, but we relaxed this constraint later. The control variables are the same as 
those used in previous sections. However, we included dummies per month in recognition of 
the existence of some seasonality.  
 
Graph 4.4 plots the informality rate for the treatment and control groups before controlling by 
observable characteristics. As can be observed, although the reform was discussed in the 
second semester of 2012 and approved in December 2012, it only started to have an impact 
in January 2014 when it was fully implemented. After this period, the model confirms that 
workers affected by the reform, or the treatment group, were less likely to engage in the 
informal sector, while this was not the case for workers in the control group. Graph 4.4 also 
indicates that relatively long-term moving averages should be considered in this type of 
analysis since the series demonstrates considerable volatility. Therefore, we defined our 
period of analysis from the first semester of 2012, before the implementation of the reform, to 
the first semester of 2014, after the implementation of the reform. Second semesters of both 
years were analysed separately. 
 
The results of the OLS exercise are presented in Table 4.9 which shows the impact of the tax 
reform on the treatment group was statistically significant, having reduced informality by 6.5 
percentage points; whereas among the control group the informality rate increased by 3.7 
percentage points. All the control variables show the expected signs. However, this exercise 
has some limitations because it assumes common time effects across groups30 and no 
changes to the composition of each group. These assumptions are less easy to control when 
there is no panel structure (Blundell 2009).  
 
To partially reduce these limitations, it is possible to use a procedure called ‘Matching 
Differences in Differences’ developed by Heckman et al. (1997). Villa (2011) developed the 
Stata code that we used in this paper. The idea is to match the treatment individuals after the 
reform with treatment individuals before the reform and with the control individuals before 
and after the reform, and then compare the differences in informality rates between the 
treatment and control groups over time31.  
 
 
  
                                               
29  According to the law, this includes workers that earn between one and 10 times the minimum wage excluding NGO 
workers. We also included those workers who reported an income close enough to the minimum wage or to ten times 
the minimum wage. In fact, we realised that a number of formal workers who probably earn the minimum wage rounded 
this figure up to the next ten thousand Colombian Pesos, and therefore we included them in the treatment group. 
30  In fact, the model can control for non-observable individual specific effects and non-observable macroeconomic effects 
because they cancel one another out, but not for non-observable temporary individual specific effects.  
31  By mixing the methodologies, Matching and Differences in Differences, the assumption of common time effects on un-
observables becomes common trend time effects on un-observables. This method does not require the linear 
assumption (Blundell 2009). 
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Graph 4.4 
Impacts of the tax reform on the treatment and control groups* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors calculations, based on GEIH 
*Self-employed not included 
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Table 4.9 
Results of the differences in differences methods (OLS) 
 
  Coef. Std. Err. t p>t 
January 0.02 0.00 6.3 0.0 
Male 0.00 0.00 0.0 1.0 
Head household 0.00 0.00 1.0 0.3 
Women Head of Household 0.00 0.01 0.4 0.7 
15-24 years -0.01 0.00 -3.1 0.0 
2-54-35 years -0.03 0.00 -8.5 0.0 
45-60 years 0.04 0.00 9.0 0.0 
60+ years 0.17 0.01 21.1 0.0 
Less than primary 0.07 0.02 4.4 0.0 
Primary 0.03 0.01 5.7 0.0 
Secondary -0.12 0.00 -25.8 0.0 
Higher education -0.20 0.01 -32.4 0.0 
Technical or university -0.05 0.01 -8.5 0.0 
Big city -0.04 0.00 -12.3 0.0 
Border city 0.04 0.00 7.8 0.0 
Test -0.28 0.00 -58.8 0.0 
Year 0.04 0.01 6.4 0.0 
Test*year -0.07 0.01 -9.8 0.0 
_cons 0.67 0.01 104.1 0.0 
Number of obs 89058       
F(18, 89039) 1121.27 
  
  
Prob> F 0 
  
  
R-squared 0.1848 
  
  
Adj R-squared 0.1846 
  
  
Root MSE 0.42176       
 
Source: Own calculations, based on GEIH 2007-2015 
*Times 
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Table 4.10 
Impact of the lowering of payroll taxes 
Results from the differences in differences and matching methods 
 
Baseline (excludes self-employment) 
First semester 2014/First semester 2012 
  Baseline Follow up   
  Control Test Difference Control Test Difference DID 
Informal workers 52.20% 25.40% -26.90% 55.90% 21.70% -34.20% -7.40% 
Std. Error 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.006 
T 168.16 81.7 -61.13 180.82 70.16 -78.25 -11.86 
P>|t| 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00% 
Second semester 2014/Second semester 2012 
  Baseline Follow up   
  Control Test Difference Control Test Difference DID 
Informal workers 53.40% 25.00% -28.40% 57.20% 20.90% -36.30% -8.00% 
Std. Error 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.006 
T 173.8 81.5 -65.3 188.7 68.8 -84.7 -13 
P>|t| 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00% 
Quality of the matching 
Weighted Variable(s) Mean Control % Bias (std) Weighted Variable(s) Mean Control % Bias (std) 
Less than primary 0.60% 0.60% 0 Male 59.10% 59.20% -0.2 
Primary 12.40% 12.10% 0.92 Head of household 47.40% 47.40% 0 
Secondary 35.50% 34.50% 2.1 
Women Head of 
Household  
11.40% 11.60% -0.63 
Higher education 40.10% 41.10% -2.04 15-24 years 16.00% 16.10% -0.27 
Technical or university 31.90% 32.80% -1.92 25-35 years 33.40% 34.80% -2.95 
Month 1 15.90% 16.10% -0.5 45-60 years 22.80% 21.30% 3.62 
Month 2 16.30% 16.00% 0.8 60+ years 3.40% 2.70% 4.07 
Month 3 17.30% 17.30% 0 Big city 37.00% 37.00% 0 
Month 4 17.40% 17.50% -0.3 Border city 8.80% 8.60% 0.09 
Month5     0.4 Total     0.09 
Placebo test 
First semester 2011/First semester 2013 
  Baseline Follow up   
  Control Test Difference Control Test Difference DID 
Informality rate 56.1% 25.9% -30.2% 53.3% 23.8% -29.5% -0.7% 
P>|t| 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 76% 
First semester 2011/First semester 2013 
Informality rates 56% 26% -30% 53% 24% -29% 1% 
P>|t| 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 17% 
 
Source: Own calculations, based on GEIH 2007-2015 
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Table 4.10 shows the results of applying the Matching and Difference in Difference methods 
for the first semester of 201432. According to the results, informality rates among the 
treatment group reduced by 7.4 percentage points in the analysis period due to the reduction 
in payroll taxes or to a shock impacting the control but not the treatment group, such as the 
reduction in payroll taxes. We also performed the exercise including self-employment and the 
results show a reduction in the informality rate of the treatment group of 6.8 percentage 
points33. Similar results were also obtained when analysing the impact between the second 
semester of 2012 and the second semester of 2014 when the informality rate of the 
treatment group reduced by 7.9 percentage points due to the reduction in payroll tax or any 
similar shock. These outcomes are comparable to what Anton (2014) predicted for the tax 
reform using a general equilibrium model and what Kugler and Kugler (2009) and Mondragon 
et al. (2010) predicted having examined historic changes in payroll tax. 
 
Some interesting conclusions were also found in analysing the specific transitions of the 
treatment and control groups during the period of analysis (2012-2014). In fact, while the 
informality rate of the treatment group in comparison with the control group decreased 
approximately 7.7 percentage points due to the tax reform, some of this change was 
explained by formal workers earning less than a minimum wage becoming fully formal 
workers earning at least a minimum wage and probably making pension and health 
contributions34.We did not find the same behaviour around the upper bound of the reform  
i.e. ten times the minimum wage. 
 
In order to test the quality of the matching, we applied the criteria developed by Rosenbaum 
and Ruben (1985)35. Table 4.8 shows that after the matching, all variables and the aggregate 
bias, which is what matters the most since we are working with p-scores - fulfil this criterion. 
We also implemented a Placebo Test to check the common trend assumption, according to 
which unobservable variables such as growth, affect the outcome variable, informality, of 
treatment and control groups in an equal way. For the Placebo Test, the Matching and 
Differences in Differences Methods are applied to any other year with similar external 
characteristics, faking the existence of a tax reform or a similar shock, with the expectation 
that the results will not be affected. We performed this exercise in relation to the previous 
period - the first and second semesters of 2012 - and compared the results with the first and 
second semesters of 2013, a period which showed similar external characteristics in terms of 
                                               
32  In estimating the p-score, we employed the same logit model used throughout the research and we included a dummy 
variable per month to control for seasonality. When conducting the matching methodology, we used the kernel 
procedure developed by Epachnikov, which has the advantage of reducing variance and making use of most available 
information. 
33  Not including self- employment in the estimations, the fulfillment of the parallel trends assumption for a considerable 
period of time before the reform was weaker; given particular changes in the self-employment affected the control but 
not the treatment group in 2010. This was one of the reasons for excluding self-employment from the main exercise.  
It is very likely that change in trends in 2010 was the result of incentives to increase formalisation at that time, 
particularly directed towards the self-employment. The behavior of both groups after these incentives is relatively stable 
and the results of the exercise including and not including self-employment are similar, suggesting that the exercise 
including self-employment is not heavily biased. 
34  By assuming that the formal workers were responsible for all the increase in the treatment group, we estimated that at 
most 4.1 of this change was due to this type of endogenity. It should also be noted that the aim of the reform was to 
obtain exactly the same results that were obtained by the increase in the treatment group i.e. to fully formalise the 
working population.We also found that the change in the treatment group was overestimated by the survey, meaning 
that if we use the Matching Differences in Differences procedure using weights we will find a lower but more robust 
impact of the reform.  
35  We tested the quality of matching by using Rosenbaum and Rubin’s (1985) rule of thumb according to which the 
standardised bias should be less than 5 per cent. Table 4.8 shows that, after matching, all the control variables 
complied with this criterion and the average bias in the p-score - that is actually what matters the most in the estimation 
- is 0.4 per cent. The standardised bias for the dummy co-variables was estimated as: 
SB= 100 *(p
c 
−p
t
) /   [{ p
t 
(1 − p
t 
) + p
c
(1 − p
c 
)} * 1/2 ] 1/ 2,where p
c
is the proportion of each co-variable in the control 
group and p
t
is the proportion of each co-variable in the treatment group. 
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growth but did not witness major changes in labour policy36. We obtained no significant 
results in informality between the treatment and control groups, as shown in Table 4.10. 
Although this test does not exclude the violation of the common trend assumption, it does 
suggest that growth or other unobserved variables did not impact informality in a differential 
manner37. 
 
Graph 4.5 
Lorenz curves 
 
Horizontal axis: Workers Income (real and imputed) 
Vertical axis: Informality Rate 
Source: Own calculations, based on GEIH 2007-2015 
 
Impact of the payroll tax reform on income distribution 
In order to be able to apply lessons from the Colombian case to other contexts and to 
analyse the impact of the reform on income distribution, we explored the characteristics of 
the workers most affected by the reform. We began by analysing the behaviour of the 
informality rate per income quintile for the first semester of 2012 and the first semester of 
2014.We performed the exercise for both observed labour income and imputed labour 
                                               
36  Same results were obtained between the first and second semesters of 2011 and the first and second semesters of 
2013. 
37  We had some concerns with the individuals who represent the formal workers in the control group in terms of the 
unobservable characteristics. This group includes some formal workers who earn more than 10 times the minimum 
wage, however most formal worker earn less than a minimum wage. This is not very common in a country like Colombia 
where the minimum wage prevails in the formal sector. Therefore, it might be the case of these workers having different 
unobservable characteristics when comparing them to the informal workers in the control group. However, as we are 
working with Differences in Differences this bias is netted when subtracting the pre-reform results, unless these 
unobservable characteristics cause un-even changes in the rate of informality during the observed period. We did not 
find any reason for such an impact, as the placebo test confirms.  
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income38. As shown in Graph 4.5, informality lowered during the period of analysis primarily 
amongst the middle-income quintile which includes minimum wage earners39.When we 
performed the Differences in Differences exercise per socio-economic group, shown in Table 
4.11, we also found that the workers with secondary education or less benefited most from 
the reform. This can be explained by the fact that the reform removed a constraint that was 
bigger for minimum wage earners compared to workers receiving higher levels of income 
where wages are more flexible. 
 
Table 4.11 
Impact of the tax reform by population group 
 
 
 Baseline Follow up 
DID 
 Outcome Control Treatment Control Treatment 
Low Educated 
(Primary or 
less) 
Informality 
𝑃 > |𝑡|𝑃
> |𝑡| 
72% 
0% 
47% 
0% 
77% 
0% 
41% 
0% 
-10.14% 
0% 
Secondary 
Informality 
𝑃 > |𝑡|𝑃
> |𝑡| 
55% 
0% 
26% 
0% 
64% 
0% 
23% 
0% 
-11.9% 
0% 
Tertiary 
education or 
higher 
Informality 
𝑃 > |𝑡|𝑃
> |𝑡| 
37% 
0% 
14% 
0% 
40% 
0% 
13% 
0% 
-4.26% 
0% 
Male 
Informality 
𝑃 > |𝑡|𝑃
> |𝑡| 
54% 
0% 
28% 
0% 
58% 
0% 
24% 
0% 
-8.21% 
0% 
25-35 years 
Informality 
𝑃 > |𝑡|𝑃
> |𝑡| 
48% 
0% 
18% 
0% 
52% 
0% 
16% 
0% 
-6.61% 
0% 
60+ years 
Informality 
𝑃 > |𝑡|𝑃
> |𝑡| 
72% 
0% 
55% 
0% 
72% 
0% 
49% 
0% 
-4.9% 
13% 
Women head of 
household 
Informality 
𝑃 > |𝑡|𝑃
> |𝑡| 
52% 
0% 
26% 
0% 
53% 
0% 
23% 
0% 
-4.0% 
3% 
 
Source: Own calculations, based on GEIH 2007-2015 
 
Summary 
The tax reform had a relatively significant impact on the informality rate of the treatment 
group after controlling for observable and some unobservable characteristics. This result 
reflects the most common findings in other studies. However, the reduction in informality 
seems to have been a one-off improvement and therefore new increases can be expected as 
a result of the current stage in the economic cycle. We also found that the payroll tax reform 
had the most impact on the middle-income population because workers in this group earn 
close to the minimum wage where the constraint was released.  
  
                                               
38  Using a Tobit function and years of education, gender, age, squared age and city as independent variables. The fit is 
reasonably accurate but it does not show the high density at the minimum wage. 
39  Second or fourth quintile, depending whether we used the current or imputed income. 
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5. Main findings 
 
Does informality promote or constrain inclusive growth? After reviewing relevant literature for 
Latin America and conducting a detailed analysis of the case of Colombia, our answer to this 
question is: it depends. As Levy (2008) claimed, the problem is not informality per se rather it 
is to too much informality which can constrain inclusive growth. In a context where it is 
important to promote decent working conditions yet formal market restrictions cannot be 
totally removed, some informality has to be tolerated. In fact, informality plays an important 
role in the economy by providing employment to a segment of the population that otherwise 
would not find a job in the formal market. However, too much informality constrains inclusive 
growth, particularly when it is caused by excessive labour market restrictions which prevent 
workers from operating in a more productive environment and from obtaining higher wages, 
benefits and work stability. Likewise, informality constrains inclusive growth when it is 
pursued on the basis of a voluntary decision, which generates negative externalities at a 
society level. More specific conclusions can be summarised as follows. 
 
Informality is a major problem in Latin America and particularly in Colombia, 
however the informality rate has diminished recently. 
The average informality rate in Latin America is high at 46 per cent. In countries such as 
Bolivia, Honduras and Paraguay informality is as high as 70 per cent. Colombia has an 
average informality rate of 48 per cent. Over the last decade, informality rates have declined 
across the region and in Colombia, probably due to high economic growth. However, there is 
a chance that informality may rise again as a result of recent downward trends in growth and 
considering that in most countries of the region, informality demonstrated counter-cyclical 
behaviour.  
 
Latin America has a poor record of inclusive growth. Nonetheless, recent growth 
was accompanied by an impressive reduction in poverty. This is also the case in 
Colombia  
Latin America is a region with medium levels of inclusive growth. Colombia sits in the 
medium- lower range and demonstrates one of the most negative relationships between 
inclusive growth and informality. In recent years, economic growth has been accompanied by 
remarkable results in poverty reduction in Latin America and particularly in Colombia where 
poverty rates almost halved from 50 per cent in 2002 to 28.5 per cent in 2014. However, 
there is some uncertainty concerning whether this trend will be resilient in the current down 
turn in growth.  
 
Informal workers in Latin America, and particularly in Colombia, are a dynamic 
mixture of diverse groups which demonstrate different relationships between 
informality and inclusive growth 
Amongst vulnerable groups in Latin America, high informality rates are accompanied by 
relatively high preferences for salaried work. These findings lead us to the conclusion that for 
these groups, informality is indeed a default option to unemployment. It is difficult to argue 
against informality being an alternative that has increased inclusive growth for this group. 
However, for the segment of the population with at least secondary school studies, 
informality may represent a constraint rather than a step towards inclusive growth, especially 
considering the high persistence rates of informality which can be considered a sort of 
poverty trap for the region. In general, the informal sector in Latin America is extremely 
diverse, with Mexico showing a higher rate of ‘voluntary’ informality and the informal sector in 
Colombia demonstrating greater heterogeneity. These findings go in line with Garcia (2014) 
who identifies heterogeneity within the Colombian informal sector, whereby some informal 
workers desire a formal job whereas a relatively smaller proportion chooses to be informal. 
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Nevertheless, the cost of informality at a society level, which is greater when 
informality includes a bigger proportion of the working population, cannot be 
ignored 
It is also important to note that although informality can be positive in terms of inclusive 
growth for some vulnerable groups, the costs at a society level should not be ignored. In fact, 
there are significant productivity differences between formal and informal sector firms and 
this reinforces what we learned from the literature in terms of other macroeconomic costs of 
informality such as tax evasion, unfair competition and higher corruption.  
 
The payroll tax reform in Colombia produced a one-time significant but moderate 
reduction in informality, and generated some positive effects on income 
distribution 
Our calculations show the Colombian 2012 tax reform had a relatively high impact of about  
7 percentage points on the informality rate among workers targeted by the reform after 
controlling for observable and some unobservable characteristics. While some of this 
increase was the result of formal workers with flexible work becoming fully formal workers 
who earn a minimum wage, this result is very much in line with the most common findings of 
previous studies. On the other hand, this reduction seems to have been a one-off 
improvement and therefore new increases in informality can be expected as a result of the 
current stage in the economic cycle. We also found that the payroll tax reform impacted 
mostly the middle-income population. This can be explained by the fact that a greater 
constraint was released for minimum wage level earners compared to higher level income 
groups where wages are more flexible. 
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6. Conclusions and policy recommendations 
 
 
When we started this research, we expected to find evidence that informality constrains 
inclusive growth, as common wisdom in the region dictates. However, as our analysis 
proceeded we discovered that informality plays an important role in society, particularly for 
vulnerable groups. This is a rather innovative perspective in the Latin American context. 
 
One of the main conclusions in this paper is that informality cannot be analysed based on the 
assumption that informal workers are a bulk mass of individuals with similar characteristics. 
Informal workers in Colombia range from poorly educated individuals, which may be 
classified as structurally informal, to highly educated young adults living in productive cities 
who can be included in the voluntary informality group. These groups show very different 
relationships between informality and inclusive growth.  
 
This analysis has important policy implications. Although an important bulk of the informal 
population is affected by formal employment barriers, ‘structural informality’ needs to be 
tackled with other kind of policies such as education. In the case of voluntary informality, 
imposing constraints on any remaining informal and economic incentives to become informal 
might be effective, whereas the same policies applied to structural informality might have a 
negative impact on inclusive growth. This lesson can be applied to most countries in Latin 
America and Africa. However, it is important to note that even if informality can be positive in 
terms of inclusive growth for some vulnerable groups, the cost of informality at a society level 
should not be ignored.  
 
Regarding the recent Colombian payroll tax reform, our estimations show a one-time 
significant but moderate reduction in the informality rate of 7 percentage points among the 
target groups after controlling for observable characteristics and partially controlling for 
unobservable characteristics. Some of this increase was the result of formal workers with 
flexible work becoming fully formal workers who earn a minimum wage. This experience is of 
the most interest for countries with high levels of payroll taxes on top of high and enforced 
minimum wages. 
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